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Principles of Authority in the Native Andean State

by

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If there is a single, general conclusion that students of Andean history can draw from Tom Zuidema's magisterial work on the Inca, it is that cult and command in the native Andean states interpenetrated to an extraordinary degree. The essence of that interpenetration was expressed visually and conceptually in the spatio-temporal organization of Cuzco and its public shrines and constituent social groups (Zuidema 1990). The social instrument for conceiving and experiencing that interpenetration was the ceque system of Cuzco. In Henri Lefebvre's (1991) terms, by means of the ceque system, the people of Cuzco conjoined spatial practice, the representation of space and representational space (that is, space as perceived, conceived and lived) in a cohesive and, to one degree or another, coherent system. By representational space, Lefebvre (1991:39) specifically means "space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols,... " representational space "overlays physical space making symbolic use of its objects." Just so, the ceque system and its constellation of shrines overlaid the physical space of Cuzco, investing the urban and rural landscape with cultural and historical meaning. We can discriminate two salient classes of symbolic associations of the 328 constructed shrines and landscape *huacas* arrayed along the ritual ceque paths of Cuzco and its near environs: water and irrigation associations on the one hand and dynastic lore and "history" on the other (Sherbondy 1982, 1992). I argue that each of these two dominant classes that we may abstract from the nature of these shrines relates to distinct principles of legitimate authority, a distinction that I will characterize as the "inside-outside" dichotomy.

The first of these associations relates symbolically to the autochthonous people of Cuzco: the original inhabitants of the valley who lived and cultivated lands in the region before their domination by the Inca elite. Fully 109, or one-third of the ceque shrines relate directly to springs, streams, rivers and pools that are actually or symbolically sources of flowing water for irrigating adjoining lands. These water-related ceque shrines can be interpreted in one sense as boundary markers, delimiting and sectioning arable land among various social groups (Zuidema 1986; Sherbondy 1992, ed.: see Sherbondy, this volume). The sacrifices made at these water shrines emphasize associations with telluric phenomena and with the fertility and genic properties of land fed by flowing water. The principle of legitimate authority expressed by these associations emerges from the rights of the autochthonous populations as the original holders of usufruct title to the land. This is the "inside" pole of my dichotomy: the legitimacy and authority that accrues from original possession and use.

The second dominant set of symbolic associations in ceque system shrines relates to the event-history of the Inca kings and queens, or the class of royalty as a whole. This "history" includes those mythical events relating to the origins of the Inca as a distinct ethnic group, and as a royal dynasty which derived its authority from outside of the Cuzco environs. It also includes events that commemorate significant actions and achievements in the lives of possibly historical Inca kings. This latter group of historical commemorative shrines are especially, although not exclusively, concentrated along the ceque paths in the quarter of Chinchaysuyu. The various Inca origin myths, so eloquently analyzed by Zuidema in a variety of pathbreaking papers, share the feature of emphasis on migration and ritualized peregrinations, or movement along a vector commemorated by landscape markers. In one version of the origin myth recorded by Juan de Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui [cited in Zuidema 1990:7], Manco Capac, the royal ancestor and founder of the Inca dynasty, migrates from Lake Titicaca to Cuzco, conquers the two principal native lords of the valley and appropriates their lands and irrigation waters. Another version of the myth recounts the origins of the Inca as an ethnic group and as a royal caste through the emergence of four couples, specifically four pairs of brothers and sisters, from sacred caves at Pacartiqtambo. This is the story of the brothers/sisters Ayar (Urbano 1981; Zuidema 1990:9-10; Urton 1990). After an extended migration northward to Cuzco, and the magical lithification of several brothers en route, Manco Capac establishes authority over the non-Inca

natives of the valley, and, again, appropriates effective title to the lands and waters of Cuzco.

These versions of the Inca origin myth share both the emphasis on migration from a sacred landscape feature (Lake Titicaca or caves, both of which have aqueous, telluric and fertility associations) to the valley of Cuzco, and the subsequent conquest and subordination of a pre-existing indigenous population. The special sociological characteristic of the first Incas is that they are all outsiders; the source of their authority stems from their very foreignness and their aggressiveness. They are archetypal *sinchis*, or warlords. They are not originally *possessed* of legitimate authority to rule, rather they must *appropriate* that authority by force. Further, they must continue to assert and reaffirm their authority by virtue of continuing peregrinations through their conquered territory. This is the opposite, "outside" pole of my proposed dichotomy: legitimate authority as appropriated or usurped by outsiders. This, of course, is nothing other than the Inca version of Sahlin's (1985) "stranger king." As Sahlin's (1985:78-80) remarks in specific reference to Polynesian kingship:

It is a remarkably common fact that the great chiefs and kings of political society are not of the people they rule. By the local theories of origin, they are strangers... power is not represented here as an intrinsic social condition. It is a usurpation, in the double sense of a forceful seizure of sovereignty and a sovereign denial of the prevailing moral order. Rather than a normal succession, usurpation is the principle of legitimacy.

At the risk of pushing the comparative interpretation too far, I would argue that this tension between the dichotomous poles of legitimate authority (possessed versus appropriated) lies at the political core of archaic states generally, and accounts, at least in part, for the apparent fragility of these traditional state formations. The ceque system in some sense was the Inca solution to integrating these opposing forces, or principles of authority into a cohering, if not completely coherent social and symbolic whole. By encapsulating or incorporating (in the case of those communities granted the status of Inca-by-privilege) non-Inca groups in the ceque system, the Inca, via collaborative, habitual social and spatial practice, effectively dampened, or at least glossed over the natural tensions and contradictions that arose from their usurpation of authority. That is, conquered and conquerors shared an ideology of worship focused on the ceque shrines of Cuzco and its environs. Encoded in this symbolic landscape of shrines were metaphorical and literal

referents to both the autochthonous inhabitants of the land who were possessed of legitimate authority and to the foreign *sinchis* who, by virtue of force-of-arms, came to usurp and appropriate legitimate authority. This is the dialectic of the inside-outside principles of authority encoded in symbolic terms within the Inca-constructed sacred geography of Cuzco.

Although we may perceive here a dialectic between opposing principles of authority, this is not a case of equivalency of power in mutual and balanced counterpose. One of the poles, or terms of this dialectic is clearly dominant, the other subordinate. The power, and *de facto* legitimacy of the successful usurper is, by definition, superior to that of authority derived from original possession, for, of course, the autochthonous groups are dislodged and dispossessed from the source of their authority: the exclusive and exclusionary right to irrigate and cultivate their land.

The Incas (and all heads of archaic states who seize their authority) assiduously attempted to perpetuate their legitimacy by becoming dwellers in cities of their own design, and from these cities they circulated into the hinterlands, in effect extending the ideological grounds of their created cosmopolitan culture into the rural interstices. As Lefebvre (1991:235) remarks:

The city state thus establishes a fixed centre by coming to constitute a hub, a privileged focal point, surrounded by peripheral areas which bear its stamp. From this moment on, the vastness of pre-existing space appears to come under the thrall of divine order. At the same time the towns seem to gather in everything which surrounds it, including the natural and divine, and the earth's evil and good forces. As image of the universe (*imago mundi*), urban space is reflected in the rural space that it possesses and indeed in a sense *contains*. Over and above its economic, religious, and political content, therefore, this relationship already embodies an element of symbolism, of image-and-reflection: the town perceives itself in its double, in its repercussions or echo; in self-affirmation, from the height of its towers, its gates, and its campaniles, it contemplates itself in the countryside that it has shaped--that is to say in its work. The town and its surroundings thus constitute a *texture* [emphases in the original].

As Lefebvre recognizes, the city of the archaic state actively shapes its countryside, constituting a fabric, or texture of social relations. The city's shaping of its hinterland proceeds conceptually, symbolically and, of course, materially through commissioned public works, such as the great irrigated terrace complexes constructed by the Inca [ed.: see Molinié, this volume],

and through the reorganization of autochthonous populations in the provinces (the *mitimae* colonization schemes being perhaps the most radical Inca instance of this process).

As in most agrarian states, particularly those lacking a merchant-market complex as was the case in the Andes, the intimate and potentially conflictive relationship between city and countryside dominates the political dynamic. This conflict is a recapitulation of the tensions reflected in the inside-outside dichotomy, the uneasy relationship between foreign rulers and autochthonous populations. But how is power extended from city to countryside in the traditional state, and in the Andes specifically? How was the principle of appropriated authority transformed into a system of governance? To approach these questions we must first consider the nature of the relationship between city and countryside in the archaic state.

Although the intensity of this city-country relationship varied over time and space in ancient agrarian states, one feature of this relationship remained constant: the city lives off the surrounding countryside by extracting tribute both in kind and in labor service (the latter form of tribute appears to have been emphasized in the Andean world). At the same time, the archaic city-state provided reciprocal services for the countryside, most notably security and the more intangible, but nevertheless powerful, sense of inclusion and participation in a greater social universe. That is, we might readily imagine that the city introjected into the countryside distinct cultural values and the promise of opportunity that provided a welcome relief from the parochial, local perspective of the rural village, its fields and its pastures. The city opened up new cultural perspectives from that of the circumscribed social landscape of the countryside. But in this the native Andean cities were distinct from those of most other preindustrial states, and this distinction most likely developed in part from the lack of "democratizing" forces inherent in cities possessed of a market-based economy. Apart from the commoners who were incorporated in a retainer capacity, the masses rarely participated in Andean urban culture at all, except on the occasion of public rituals. Commoners flowed into these cities at prescribed moments: they were, in some sense, religious tourists in a kind of elite theme park that was carefully orchestrated to impart to them simultaneously a sense of emotional participation in, but social segregation from the esoteric world of the elite.

The *raison d'être* of the Andean city was not fundamentally economic, but rather political and ideological in nature [ed.: see Turner, this volume]. Not surprisingly, these Andean cities displayed an intense concern for public

symbolism that connected city to countryside, and urban elites to rural commoners. Elsewhere I have analyzed the public architecture of Tiwanaku precisely in terms of symbolic references to a perduring mystique of rural culture (Kolata and Ponce 1992; Kolata 1993). These capitals were the distilled essence of elite belief, the focal points of publically expressed concepts of universal order. To exert any moral authority over the rural hinterlands, they needed a coherent, immediately understandable design that directly, perhaps even with exaggerated, chiaroscuro-like effect, expressed a sense of man's (and still more specifically one's own ethnic group's) place in the world. Ironically this sense of place, expressed with monumentality in the architecture of the cities, explicitly evoked a rural sensibility. The life of farms and fields in the countryside provided the model for the essential relationship between humankind and nature that profoundly influenced the internal design and social order of the city. The symbolic text written into the design of these cities was one which attempted to identify, or to harmonize the productive (yet potentially destructive) forces of nature with the culturally created order of human society. At the same time, these capitals were the fulcrum for mediating the potentially violent conflicts between elites and commoners, city and countryside that always threatened to erupt. As Lefebvre remarks (1991:234-35), "the town—urban space—has a symbiotic relationship with that of rural space over which (if often with much difficulty) it holds sway."

But if there was an intense *symbolic* interconnectedness of city (and state) to country in native Andean society, what was the political and economic articulation? How did the capitals "hold sway," however tenuously, over their tributary hinterlands in the Andean world? One initial point of purchase for attacking this problem is to consider the debates on the organizational principles that governed agricultural production in these archaic states, for, of course, the fundamental source of wealth and finance for these societies was the intensification of crop production. Like most debates, the terms of engagement on this question have been polarized into two competing schools of thought, which, for purposes of convenience, I will characterize as the "top-down" (centralized) versus the "bottom-up" (non-centralized) perspectives.

One classic exposition of the top-down perspective, the Wittfogel (1957) hypothesis, has generated a particularly passionate body of literature (see Mitchell [1973] for an excellent summary of that literature). The Wittfogel hypothesis postulated that large-scale irrigation requires centralized

management of the hydraulic infrastructure and explained the origins of agrarian state societies in arid lands in terms of increased political integration resulting from the need for centralized control of irrigation. The current consensus on the Wittfogel hypothesis rejects both the assumption that large-scale hydraulic works presuppose the presence of centralized authority and the causal inference that links the emergence of state societies with the organizational requirements of such hydraulic infrastructures (Hunt 1988; Mitchell 1973, 1977). Justifiably, contemporary scholars of early state societies view the degree of centralization in intensive agricultural systems as highly variable, and demonstrate, in many cases, that the organization of such systems lies outside the purview of state bureaucracies (Netherly 1984), or even excludes explicitly political institutions and authorities from the decision-making apparatus altogether (Lansing 1991). Rather than looking to the central authorities for the principles that structured intensive agricultural production in these states (the "top-down perspective"), these scholars emphasize the importance of recognizing the organizational initiatives and context-sensitive strategies of local farmers (the "bottom-up perspective"). In general, scholars immersed in the latter perspective seem to accept that intensive systems of agricultural production require some form of (weakly) hierarchical organization, but that there was a tendency in these traditional states to use the minimum amount of organization necessary to maintain the hydraulic infrastructure, while retaining a cultural mechanism for seeking higher levels of organization when necessary (regional dispute resolution, disaster response and the like). Certain recent literature in Andean archaeology and ethnohistory closely follows this new orthodoxy, asserting the dominance of local kin groups rather than hierarchical, supracommunity state authority in the organization of agricultural production (Netherly 1984; Erickson 1988; see also Schaedel 1988 who extends this analysis to Andean cosmology and worldview; and Graffam 1990, 1992). Although this perspective provides a necessary corrective to a rigid, Wittfogellian formulation, uncritical application can lead to an equally dogmatic position that overlooks, or even denies, the reality of centralized state action on local communities in Andean societies.

The terms of the top-down versus bottom-up debate (in the Andeanist literature at least) have been muddled also by terminological confusions and the imputation of inappropriate, or excessively narrow meanings to such terms as "bureaucracy" and "centralization of authority." Scholars adhering to the "populist," bottom-up perspective frequently equate the emergence of

centralized authority with bureaucracies and then point out (with justification) that formal bureaucracies were exceedingly rare in traditional states. The implications of this argument are straightforward: most decision-making in traditional states was decentralized, remaining in the hands of local corporate groups, and therefore the impact of the state on local societies was limited to "surface" extraction of tribute and periodic labor service. From this perspective, the underlying structure and functioning of local social groups remains nearly unaltered by the alien powers of the state.

The notion that an expansive state society would have only superficial impact on local communities strikes me as an oddly anachronistic theoretical framework that, in some senses, echoes the hoary concept of peasant societies as closed, corporate communities encapsulated in a kind of cultural amber seeping out of habitual social action. To approach a better understanding of the dynamic relationships between the state and local communities, we must reformulate such static, ahistorical models. First, it is important to be clear on the various bases and mechanisms for transmitting and exchanging power from city to countryside, and from elites to commoners in agrarian states. We must acknowledge that the relationship between such states and local communities was not invariably an oppressive, extractive proposition. States and local communities are often counterpoised in a complex dynamic of mutualism. Although states exert directive control over regional economies, and in the process impinge on the traditional prerogatives and autonomy of local communities, they also introject these communities into more inclusive social and economic worlds. States create interconnections among diverse communities, and, in essence, promote a process of accelerated local economic development. States, in turn, by identifying themselves as the agents of development derive legitimacy, prestige and an intensification of their social power (Ludden 1992). Further, the centralization of authority in traditional states does not invariably imply the (western-style) bureaucratization of power. Still less does it signal the emergence of formal bureaucracies in the modern sense of the term.

With respect to the relationship between bureaucracies and centralization of authority, I would argue the exact obverse of the position taken by the bottom-up populists. Bureaucracies, rather than being the vehicle for centralization of authority, generate social relations that are inherently democratizing and decentering. Decision-making emanates effectively not from a central locus or personage, but from a diffuse penumbra of legitimate authority applied locally and subject to considerable, and potentially

idiosyncratic, interpretation by its local agents. Bribes, payoffs, sweetheart deals, favoritism, creative cooking of administrative books, collusion between taxpayers and petty officials all are standard features of life under "impersonal" bureaucracies. Most people living in bureaucratic systems come into contact consistently only with the lowest echelon of bureaucrats. These highly variegated, local textures in the administration of bureaucracies open wide the possibilities of covert resistance to state mandates and exactions. Administering edicts from the center withers under the corrosive assault of real life.

A brief digression to explore bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic forms of authority will serve to further clarify this central issue. As formulated in Max Weber's (1978:956) defining work, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundrisse der verstehenden Soziologie*, some salient characteristics of modern bureaucracy include a:

... principle of official *jurisdictional areas*, which are generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative regulation. This means: (1) The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are assigned as official duties. (2) The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials. (3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the exercise of the corresponding rights...

Weber's concept of the fully modern bureaucracy requires the explicit articulation of a rational *theory* of public administration. That is, the power of the state on the individual is exercised through a system of formal rules, applied abstractly and without conscious reference to the actors' social personae and statuses. This kind of abstract regulation of state affairs is a notion alien in the extreme to the native states of the Americas, and most likely, to most archaic states of the world. The principles of the exercise of authority in these traditional states are radically different from those embedded in western concepts of bureaucracy. What might these alternative principles be?

Again, Weber (1978:1006), drawing on his peculiar acuity in eliciting trans-cultural, trans-temporal sociological categories, provides us with a key insight in his discussion of patriarchal and patrimonial forms of authority contrasted to bureaucratic forms of domination.

Among the prebureaucratic types of domination the most important one by far is patriarchal domination. Essentially it is based not on the official's commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on strictly personal loyalty. The roots of patriarchal domination grow out of the master's authority over his household.

Weber treats patrimonial authority as a special case (and an extension beyond the parochial domain of the household) of the more ubiquitous forms of patriarchal domination. One of his prime examples of patrimonial authority elaborated into an expansive state formation was pharaonic Egypt (here he also mentions the Inca in passing). Weber comments that all of the subject territories and populations of pharaonic Egypt might be considered as "a single tremendous *oikos* ruled patrimonially by the pharaoh" (1978:1013) [the meaning of *oikos* here refers to a large, authoritarian household of a prince or manorial lord: see Weber 1978:381]. As Wheatley (1971:52) notes, one of the characteristics of patrimonial authority conceived by Weber was that the ruler (the supreme patriarch as it were) "treats all political administration as his personal affair, while the officials, appointed by the ruler on the basis of his personal confidence in them, in turn regard their administrative operations as a personal service to their ruler in a context of duty and respect."

And so the fundamental lineaments of patrimonial authority derive from sentiments of personal obligation reinforced by tradition. However, Weber rightly recognized that the principal strut undergirding the patrimonial authority of a ruler (originally identified closely with military action: in short, the power that accrues to a warlord) was "a consensual community which also exists apart from his independent military force and which is rooted in the belief that the ruler's powers are legitimate insofar as they are *traditional* (1978:1020, emphasis in the original). The importance of this insight cannot be underestimated for it introduces the issue of the role of ideology in the construction of authority and the emergence of hierarchically-organized societies. In a similar vein, Godelier (1978:767) remarks that "the power of domination consists of two indissoluble elements whose combination constitutes its strength: violence and consent;" but "of these two components of power, the stronger is not the violence of the dominant, but the consent of the dominated to their domination. Ideology as a shared belief system assumes a central position in maintaining the consent, or, better said, acquiescence of the dominated social classes to a hierarchical social order. Yet given this construction, the question then arises, why

would a dominated class consent to and actively participate in a belief system that serves the interests of an elite, dominating class? Godelier's solution to this conundrum makes great intuitive sense: participation in the society-wide belief system also enhanced the economic interests of the dominated class. Specifically, Godelier hypothesized that an elite ideology that reifies hierarchical relations of dominance and exploitation could only be promoted and perpetuated if these relations were cast in the form of an exchange of services between the elite and the dominated. The precise form of this hypothesized exchange of services may vary, but Godelier (1978:767) suggests that in the case of early agrarian-based, state formations the emerging elite class would offer esoteric knowledge of the supernatural realm, of "invisible realities and forces controlling (in the thought of these societies) the reproduction of the universe and of life" in exchange for the supplementary labor of the commoners [ed.: see Turner, this volume]. One could also conceive of a variety of other, more directly pragmatic services that an elite class could offer to commoners: adjudication of boundary disputes, maintenance of security, management of redistribution networks, administering social and economic linkages among diverse local communities and the like. Still as Godelier acknowledges, even if dominated classes share to one degree or another the system of political and economic ideas, beliefs and symbols promulgated by a dominant class, the threat and the power of coercion hovers in the background.

Embedded in the original structure of Weber's patrimonial states was an incipient hierarchy and an inherent, dynamic process or tendency towards social differentiation. Hierarchy in patrimonial state office emerges first in the context of the tightly inbred world of the prince's *oikos*. In a social environment in which personal obligation and fealty are the *sine qua non* of office, the ruler turns first to his kinsmen and immediate dependents for creating a body of administrative officials. These immediate dependents, even though they may have conflicted loyalties of their own, or, for the more highly placed, strategies for usurping princely authority for themselves, are nevertheless more easily manipulated being, on the whole, resident at court (the extended household of the prince). But, as Weber (1978:1026) implies, the expansion of princely authority beyond a local, parochial domain increases administrative burdens to the point at which the ruler must recruit officials "in an extrapatrimonial fashion." In this manner, of necessity, inner and outer circles of officials develop. These inner and outer "courts" perform similar administrative functions on behalf of the prince's expanding *oikos*,

but they exhibit differential access to and degrees of dependency on the ruler. Personal contact and public demonstrations of reciprocity in the form of gift exchange, reciprocal hosting of banquets and the like were the life's blood of this kind of politico-administrative system.

Given that personal contact and public appearance was essential to the legitimacy of leadership, it is not surprising to learn that in these patrimonial states the king was often itinerant and that his court moved with him when he was on tour. David Keightley (1983:551-552) offers a particularly incisive description of the role and meaning of the itinerant king in the specific historical context of the early Chinese Shang state:

The king displayed his power by frequent travel, hunting, and inspecting along the pathways of his realm, delegating little of his military power and expecting no "legal" or "constitutional" military support in return... If, as the inscriptions suggest, the state was in origin an alliance of independent groups whose tutelary spirits were incorporated into the genealogy and ritual structure of the court as their leaders joined the Shang federation... , then the king in his travels would have moved through a landscape pregnant with symbolic meaning, sacrificing to the local spirits, giving and receiving power at each holy place, and thus renewing the religious and kin ties (fictive or not) that bound the state together... Power so itinerant in nature suggests in turn that the capital may have been a base of operations, a cult center, a necropolis, and industrial and artesansal center, rather than a fixed administrative and redistributive center.

Much of what Keightley eloquently describes for the king's role in Shang society and the nature of Shang capitals applies with equal force to the Inca state. Like their Shang counterparts, Inca kings were constantly in motion. They struck out with glittering retinues of warriors, priests and camp followers on battle campaigns, on elaborate tours of their provinces, on pilgrimages to sacred shrines. In this sense, we can interpret the ceque lines as the ritually prescribed paths of peregrination along which the king moved with majesty and religious piety, but impelled by a latent political purpose as well [ed.: see Urton, this volume]. Some Inca kings were absent from Cuzco for years on end, bringing into question the true political role of Cuzco as an administrative center. It would seem that the administration of the Inca empire was effected not from decision makers resident in a fixed capital, but rather from the coterie of kinsmen and dependents clustered around the moving court, in concert with "patrimonial officials" resident in the provinces.

One intriguing corollary of this insight into the nature of authority in the Inca state is that we can reformulate the traditional interpretation of the many "reconquests" that descendants of earlier Inca kings were said to have effected in "rebellious" provinces as an entirely different process altogether: locally anticipated ritual state visits of the king and his court. These state visits may have been framed in a public idiom that commemorated earlier periods of martial conflict occasioned by the initial encounter and absorption of a region into the expanding Inca empire. That is, the king may have appeared in these provinces with his armed retinue in full battle regalia to remind the locals of the relative positions of dominance and subordination, but the actual interaction entailed not reconquest but rather reaffirmation of established social bonds. Given the specific historical moment in which the Spanish chroniclers were writing their texts, having before their eyes, as it were, the recent Christian *reconquista* of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors, it is not surprising that they may have understood and recorded the Inca kings' peregrinations throughout their Andean world as if they were episodes of reconquest rather than as a ritualized, recurrent technique of rule. Of course, we cannot doubt that there were genuine instances of resistance, rebellion and reconquest in Inca provinces, but we must remain sensitive to the possibility that at least some of these "reconquests" were instead cyclical returns of the king to strategic provinces of his domain.

The ritual peregrinations of the Inca kings did not cease even after they died. As Bernabé Cobo ([1653] 1890-95:339-41) recounts, the members of the kings royal *ayllus*:

... brought [the royal mummies], lavishly escorted, to all their most important ceremonies. They sat them all down in the plaza in a row, in order of seniority, and the servants who looked after them ate and drank there... In front of the mummies they also placed large vessels like pitchers, called *vilques*, made of gold and silver. They filled these vessels with maize beer and toasted the dead with it, after first showing it to them. The dead toasted one another, and they drank to the living... this was done by their ministers in their names. When the *vilques* were full, they poured them over a circular stone set up as an idol in the middle of the plaza. There was a small channel around the stone, and the beer ran off through drains and hidden pipes.

This lurid spectacle of the descendants of dead kings ministering to their ancestors' elaborately costumed, dessicated corpses with offerings of food, drinks and toasts obscures the subtle political and religious nuances

embedded in the cult of the royal mummies. Although grounded in the pan-Andean religious practice of ancestor worship, this elite cult was transformed into something more than the simple veneration of a dead lineage ancestor. In the first instance, the elaborate feasting of the dead royals was organized around and intended as ceremonies of agricultural fertility: "when there was need for water for the cultivated fields, they usually brought out [the dead king's] body, richly dressed, with his face covered, carrying it in a procession through the fields and punas, and they were convinced that this was largely responsible for bringing rain" (Cobo [1653] 1979:125). Dead kings were frequently addressed in the protocols of *panaqa* toasts as *Illapa*, the weather deity who personified the atmospheric forces of wind, rain, hail, lightning and thunder: all of those meteorological phenomena responsible for the growth or destruction of agricultural crops [ed.: see Cook, this volume].

In another important signification, the public display of the royal mummies during state occasions, arranged in order of seniority, was a graphic affirmation of the legitimacy of Inca dynastic rule. On these occasions, the reigning king would participate in ceremonial processions quite literally in conjunction with the complete line of his royal ancestors, who were physically represented by their richly adorned, relictual bundles. Who could contest the legitimacy of the Inca when the entire dynasty, the distilled history of their ruling mandate, was constantly visible and present to the nation? By these ritual actions, the deceased monarchs and the living emperor symbolically became one: embodiments of legitimate power, emblems of agricultural fertility and abundance, and powerful icons of national identity. It would seem that in life as in death the Inca kings were addicted to movement in and through their provinces, to ritual peregrinations to the shrines of the state cults, to processions invested with a progression of symbols focused on the figure and body of the king, symbols that were intended to socialize natural forces and naturalize the social order. As Weber apparently sensed, like pharaonic Egypt, authority in the Inca state was archetypically patrimonial.

Inevitably, the political and psychological realities of the patrimonial state were characterized by varying degrees of fluidity, anxiety and instability, particularly in territories of the domain beyond the original core holdings under the direct influence of the paramount lord. The legitimacy of kingly office had to be created and recreated anew by intimate contact with subjects. From the strictly administrative point of view, predatory, expansionistic, patrimonial states, such as pharaonic Egypt or the Inca,

rapidly develop highly differentiated patrimonial offices, defined and hierarchized in terms of their degree of relatedness to the paramount ruler. The political coin of the realm, as it were, becomes the ability to demonstrate, or argue convincingly for one's real or fictive kinship ties with the paramount. These highly differentiated offices functioned, in effect, as a proto-bureaucracy, or perhaps more aptly phrased, a patrimonial bureaucracy in which the language of authority was voiced in the idiom of kinship. This kind of "bureaucratization" of patrimonial office results in the *de facto* emergence of new status groups, cohorts of local lords and state clients with a commonality of interest focused on desire for recognition and representation at the court of the ruler. These local lords, in turn, operate from a politico-economic base that recapitulates on a smaller-scale the structural forms of the paramount ruler's *oikos*. They compete to form their own independent, or quasi-independent, patrimonial estates through which they extend their influence and control over local populations. Importantly, these local lords frequently seek to appropriate the religious mystique of the paramount's authority by replicating the architectural and symbolic configurations of the paramount's capital.

Structurally, the geo-political landscape of the patrimonial state consists of a congeries of petty polities coalesced around the households of local lords linked only tenuously, if at all, to each other, but merged administratively into the *oikos* of the paramount ruler [ed.: see Isbell, this volume]. That is, political, social and administrative linkages in such a state structure are strong vertically, but weak, or incompletely developed horizontally. The personalized, centralizing nature of ultimate authority in such a structure results in a weakening or disintegration of "natural" affinities within ethnic and other traditional local groups in favor of opportunistic gravitation toward the court of the ruler.

Elsewhere, inspired by Weberian categories, I characterized this geo-political landscape in the Andean world as a "*hyper-oikos*" (Kolata 1983: 367). By this term, I meant that the economy and political influence of the paramount's household extended far beyond the confines of his capital's circumscribed hinterland. The agents of that extension were the elites who governed the provincial settlements. These aristocratic managers were either directly or symbolically related to members of the royal household, and they worked to further the economic and political ends of that household. This is the meaning behind the Inca political device of installing Incas by privilege. The *hyper-oikos* was essentially a technique of building an empire by

integrating a class of elite in an extended, fictive kinship system. These elite were bound in a complex network of privilege and obligation that was manipulated by the royal household. As I read Weber, he considered pharaonic Egypt to be, in essence, *hyper-oikos*: a gigantic extension of an imperial household ruled through a network of client states and local lords with the twin devices of subtle suasion through the force of sacred tradition and of implicit threat of physical retaliation for rebelliousness from the household's militarized politico-administrative center (the court of the warlord-king).

One essential principle, or better yet, strategy of statecraft in such a *hyper-oikos* system was to confirm the traditional political authority of local lords in dealing with their own communities and subjects. This is a strategy that emerges from simple political pragmatism. Pedro de Cieza de León ([1553] 1959:57), among other Spanish commentators intrigued by native Andean principles of command, astutely described this phenomenon in his great chronicle of Perú: "And they had another device to keep the natives from hating them, and this was that they never divested the natural chieftans of their power. If it so happened that one of them... in some way deserved to be stripped of his power, it was vested in his sons or brothers, and all were ordered to obey them." This system of preserving the local mandate of the native elite has been aptly termed indirect rule. For an empire that was rapidly, almost frenetically expanding, and only in the nascent stages of generating formal principles of colonial governance, this system of indirect rule was simple to implement, relatively efficient and the least intrusive in altering the daily rhythms and decision-making autonomy of potentially hostile local communities. The key to the success of indirect rule was the ability to secure the co-operation and at least overt political loyalty of the local *curacas*. One strategy for co-opting these local lords was worked out through marriage alliances with the Inca elite which established irrevocable bonds of kinship.

The ritualized exchange of daughters as marriage partners between Inca and local elite created powerful incentives for the provincial political leaders to "buy into" the Inca system: the network of real and fictive kinship ties engendered by these alliances provided rich opportunities to local lords for strategic manipulation of the resulting patron-client relationship. Of course this strategy of enticing the local *curacas* into the patronage system by holding out the promise of wealth and enhanced social prestige was effective only as long as they were able to deliver the labor and productive capacity of

their people. The Inca realized this critical linkage and helped the local *curacas* resolve this potential conflict through massive displays of state generosity. As described by an anonymous chronicler:

The Incas used to win the benevolence of their vassals by organizing every now and then festivities which many neighboring inhabitants attended; these were the [occasions of] happiness for all these barbarians and there the Inca offered with his own hands *mates* or drinking vases of *chicha* to the *caciques* to drink, which was a great favor; equally he gave them clothes to wear from his proper [deposit], and silver vases and some other things; they were such the subjects that they could not [normally] eat other meat than guinea pig, but during those festivities they were given the meat of alpaca and llama, which is very good meat; and this they took as a great favor and gift (Anónimo [1583] 1925:292 cited in Pärssinen 1992:410-411).

Like the Roman's policy of bread and circuses intended to diffuse the potentially explosive problem of a malcontent underclass, the Inca practice of periodically redistributing warehoused food, drink and clothing to the commoners during state sponsored festivals dissipated social tensions and incorporated commoners into the new economic and social order of the Inca world.

Although adopted in the first stages of colonializing encounters between cultures as an expedient political strategy, indirect rule, by its very nature, is an evanescent, shifting, tension-plagued device of command. The cultural politics of such encounters necessarily entails transformations which may take the form of assimilation, mutual acculturation, rapid syncretization in some cultural domains and perduring resistance in others. The inexorability of change is readily predictable, although the depth and direction of such change is not. Paramounts may move to exert increasing control over subordinate lords and the resources of their domains through more direct means such as the imposition of innovative administrative devices. Local lords, on the other hand, may simultaneously seek to strengthen the grip of their authority over their subjects while strategically currying favor with the overlord. Alternatively, they may seek to resist the paramount covertly or, from time to time, through outright rebellion. In short, indirect rule is not an effective *principle* of state governance, but an intermediate stage in a process of colonial encounter.

An Andean example of the inevitable transformative processes embedded in the nature of indirect rule is apropos. Late in the historical

trajectory of the Inca state, Inca kings were attempting to supersede techniques of indirect rule by adopting a number of administrative devices designed to consolidate their authority over subject provinces. One of these devices, known as the *mitimae*, held special fascination for the Spanish, perhaps because they recognized some strategic elements in that institution that echoed their own European traditions of statecraft [ed.: see Sherbondy, this volume]. Pedro de Cieza de León ([1553] 1959:57) provides us with an early, detailed description of the *mitimae* that vividly captures the essence of the institution:

As soon as one of these large provinces was conquered, ten or twelve thousand of the men and their wives, or six thousand, or the number decided upon, were ordered to leave and remove themselves from it. These were transferred to another town or province of the same climate and nature as that which they left... and these were called *mitimaes*, which means Indians come from one land to another. They were given land to work and sites on which to build their homes. And these *mitimaes* were ordered by the Incas to be always obedient to what their governors and captains ordered, so that if the natives should rebel, and they supported the governor, the natives would be punished and reduced to the service of the Incas. Likewise if the *mitimaes* stirred up disorder, they were put down by the natives. In this way these rulers had their empire assured against revolts and the provinces well supplied with food, for most of the people, as I have said, had been moved from one land to another.

In a passage remarkable for its analytical perceptiveness, Cieza de León goes on to distinguish three classes of *mitimae*: military, political and economic. The military *mitimae* served an important function as border guards, populating and commanding army garrisons on the fringes of the expanding Inca state. These were essentially groups of soldiers/citizens who maintained a military profile on behalf of the Inca as well as reclaiming and cultivating lands and herding llama and alpaca on the border zones of the empire. The second class of transplanted colonists, the political *mitimae*, served similar security functions as that of the *mitimae* who populated the border outposts. These *mitimae* were more numerous, and could be found in every province of the empire. They were forcibly removed from their homelands, and resettled in other provinces where they were required to retain their distinctive ethnic costume, headdress, customs and forms of social organization. The strategic goal underlying Inca implantation of political *mitimae* was to reduce the chances for rebellion in conquered

provinces by shattering traditional patterns of shared ethnic identity among large, contiguous populations. By intermixing local inhabitants with pockets of foreigners in self-contained colonies, the Inca substantially inhibited the potential for subversive political coalitions. Cieza de León characterized the third use of *mitimae* colonists as "stranger" than the others. He goes on to describe these economic *mitimae* in the following terms:

... if, perchance, they had conquered territory in the highlands or plains or on a slope suitable for plowing and sowing, which was fertile and had a good climate... they quickly ordered that from near-by provinces that had the same climate as these... enough people come in to settle it, and to these lands were given, and flocks, and all the provisions they needed until they could harvest what they planted... For a number of years no tribute was exacted of these new settlers, but on the contrary they were given women, coca, and food so that they would carry out the work of settlement with better will ([1553] 1959:62).

To Cieza de León and other Spanish military men the use of frontier garrisons and colonial outposts was entirely familiar. But the Inca principle of economic *mitimae* was alien to these products of an essentially feudal, medieval European tradition. First, this principle incorporated the unfamiliar Andean ideal of reciprocity: in transplanting populations to reclaim productive lands in a new province, the state was obligated to provide the colonists with a "grubstake:" food, coca and women. Secondly, these *mitimae* colonists were exempted from taxation until they could reclaim enough land to sustain themselves and produce a surplus for the state. Finally, few Spanish chroniclers or administrators grasped the significance of the economic *mitimae* as state expressions of the Andean principle of economic complementarity. The principal intent of the economic *mitimae* was to enhance the productive capacity of the Inca state by reclaiming marginal land, and, in some cases, by focusing the labor of thousands of transplanted colonists on the production of a single prestige crop: maize.

The three categories of Inca *mitimae*, then, cross-cut each other: political *mitimae* frequently served economic functions; military *mitimae* were, almost by definition, also political *mitimae*; large-scale economic *mitimae* colonization schemes such as in the Cochabamba Valley, (Wachtel 1982) by their organization and multiethnic composition, became simultaneously effective security devices. The number of colonists relocated in these projects was highly variable, ranging from extended families of a few persons to entire villages and ethnic groups reaching into the thousands, as

in the case of Huayna Capac's reorganization of the Cochabamba Valley. We have no precise information on the total number of people in the Inca state removed from their homelands and resettled elsewhere. But all sources indicate that this was a substantial proportion of the population (Rowe 1982). Such massive transfers of communities and villages as *mitimae*, who became directly dependent upon the Inca state bureaucracy for political security and for the potential of enhancing their own social position and economic well-being, resulted in a gradual dissemination of Inca language, values, expectations and cultural beliefs. Under the impact of this program of population mixing on an imperial scale, old ethnic identities, traditional *ayllu* affinities and beliefs began to slowly transform themselves in conformity with the new Inca ideal, enhancing unification of the empire itself (Rowe 1982).

A second innovative administrative device that the Inca attempted to insinuate into their system of command was a more formal, centralized channel of tribute and labor recruitment based on a decimal system of administration (Julien 1982). In this system, labor obligations were assessed on an ascending numerical series of tributary households that began with a minimal unit of 10 households (termed *chunka*) and terminated with the maximal unit of 10,000 households (*hunu*). Between these limits, there were decimal groupings for 50, 100, 500, 1000 and 5000 tributary households. The Inca state periodically took a census to account for fluctuations in the size and residential patterns of the empire's population. On the basis of the census figures recorded on imperial *quipu*, they adjusted membership in these decimal groupings of tributary households to reflect changing demographic realities. Each decimal unit was headed by an official who, at the lower levels of the household groupings, was drawn from the local communities. Officers of the various decimal units were ranked in a formal, pyramid-like hierarchy with respect to one another. Some officials were appointed to their offices by higher ranking decimal administrators, others, however, appear to have inherited their positions. The chain of command and reporting responsibility began with the basal *chunka* leader and proceeded upwards progressively to the *hunu* officials. Above the rank of the *hunu* heads of 10,000 households, administrative responsibility was vested in the hands of individuals with direct consanguineal or political ties to the royal households of Cusco: these were the surrogates of the emperor himself, serving as provincial governors, or as members of the imperial council which

included extremely high ranking representatives from each of the four quarters of the realm.

In effect, as the Inca began to consolidate their authority in a conquered province, they gradually attempted to streamline the complicated political mosaic of multiple claims to power and traditional prerogatives asserted by local lords through imposition of the uniform decimal system of administration. Although this system had clear benefits for the Inca central government, permitting the state to operate with a more "rationalized" form of political organization and labor recruitment in a pluralistic social landscape, the advantage to local *curacas* was not as readily apparent. With the emergence of what was essentially an imperial class system of favored officials, those *curacas* who were not designated as decimal officers saw many of their social prerogatives and traditional access to local labor pools begin to dissolve. Moreover, these attempts to rationalize principles of labor recruitment and tribute assessment had equally corrosive effects on the traditional kin-based groups of corporate affiliation. Higher-order systems of *ayllus* (that is, those that have been designated by Platt [1986] from an ethnographic context as major and maximal *ayllus*) were broken apart through *mitimae* recolonization schemes or subsumed under higher-order tributary schemes such as the Inca's decimal-based administrative reorganization of household groups.

We see, then, that the transactional, ambiguous principle of indirect rule, which required uneasy balancing of local autonomy with subordination to increasing tributary demands, rapidly came under pressure from the Inca kings from a number of directions. These efforts to "rationalize" chains of command after the initial colonial encounters brings into sharp relief the provisional and instable character of the relationships between paramounts and local lords. Processes of rapid political revisionism, instigated by both paramounts and local lords alike, appear to be a recurrent feature of patrimonial states, or at least those patrimonial states that took off on a trajectory of territorial expansionism. I would argue that the rulers of expansive patrimonial states inevitably attempt to replace indirect rule with more homogenous and "rationalized" principles of command, and that the resulting tensions of this move toward intensifying autocracy contribute to the inherent structural fragility of traditional agrarian states.

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