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Of Kings and Capitals

Principles of Authority and the Nature of Cities in the Native Andean State

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Cities, and the larger political formations within which they are embedded, are dynamic congeries of political, economic, and social institutions that are shaped and reshaped by historical circumstance. This dynamism and mutability in the face of exogenous forces might suggest the impossibility of a coherent, general theory about the forms and forces of urban transformation of the archaic city. Underlying the seemingly chaotic, undirected exigencies that constitute the life cycle of cities, however, are regularities of structure and similarities in form, function, and historical evolution that provide touchstones for a such a theory. In this respect, I am in complete agreement with Charlton and Nichols (this volume) on the validity of cross-cultural analyses.

This chapter explores the structure of indigenous cities of the Andean region and evaluates them in terms of cities elsewhere in the preindustrial world. This comparative method will set the organizational principles that structured certain Andean cities in a richer context of regional and empirical variability, thereby bringing into relief potential patterns of similarity and dissimilarity. My specific focus is on the urban system of the Inca, for which documentary evidence is richest, but I will also refer to two other expansionist state societies—Tiwanaku in the Lake Titicaca basin and Chan Chan, capital of the north coast Peruvian kingdom of Chimor (Fig. 14.1). The basic lineaments of the argument I make apply to these Andean capitals as well.

Each of these Andean states was characterized by a symbolically dominant metropole, with secondary cities subordinate to the center. This configuration contrasts dramatically with other urban systems in the prehispanic Americas—for instance, that of the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Basin of Mexico, where a constellation of relatively autonomous city-states was enmeshed in a complex matrix of politics and elite competition for natural and human resources (Hodge, this volume). In some sense, city-states—defined as “small, territorially based, politically independent state systems with a city and a hinterland, relatively self-sufficient economically and relatively homogeneous ethnically”—were rare in the Andean highlands. The only examples that seem to coincide with this definition are the Aymara Kingdoms of the Lake Titicaca basin (particularly the Lupaca and Colla) prior to their incorporation into the Inca empire in the mid-fifteenth century. These kingdoms appear to be the product of the disintegration of the Tiwanaku empire during the eleventh century.




Figure 14.1. Map of the Andes showing places mentioned in the text.

In other words, the city-state phenomenon in the Lake Titicaca basin in prehispanic times may have been the result of political balkanization that followed imperial collapse—a derivative, rather than autochthonous process (similar to that envisioned by J. Marcus [1989] for the post-Teotihuacán Mesoamerican world).

Archaeological investigation in the Andean highlands is still in its infancy, and future research may reveal other instances of city-state formations, as the product of either primary or secondary developmental processes. Even so, I would argue that we can define a number of characteristics of ancient Andean capitals that distinguish them from their counterparts elsewhere in the preindustrial world. All these distinguishing characteristics are related in one degree or another to the patrimonial principles of authority that underlie the origins and structure of these cities (Weber 1978).

The first of these characteristics—the lack of either price-fixing or administered markets—is probably the single most distinguishing feature of the Andean city, one that sets it apart from other preindustrial cities. A second distinguishing feature of Andean capitals is their relative lack of social heterogeneity, a feature reflected in and flowing from two additional characteristics—low urban population size and intense development of instruments of social control within the urban environment.

Andean capitals and their secondary urban settlements were essentially regal and religious in nature. They were the seats of royal lineages and the centers of cults. The intersection of political and religious authority is expressed materially in an exaggerated form of necrolatry: many of the great temples and palaces of Cuzco, Tiwanaku, and Chan Chan were repositories for the mummified remains of deceased kings. Andean kings, in an ideological sense, never died. Thus

an essential core of Andean religiosity was ancestor worship, and dead royals were at the summit of a hierarchy of deceased lineage and ethnic group ancestors.

Andean cities were centers for elite cultural definition and self-expression; a large resident population of commoners was inimical to their purpose and function. Apart from commoners incorporated into the cities in a retainer capacity, the masses rarely participated in urban culture, except on ritual occasions. Not surprisingly, several—perhaps most—Andean capitals were focal points for pilgrimages. Commoners flowed into the cities at prescribed times: in a real sense, they were religious tourists in an elite theme park that imparted a sense of emotional participation in, but social segregation from, that esoteric world. Access to Andean capitals such as Cuzco and Chan Chan was consciously restricted by soaring palace and boundary walls and tortuous pathways within the great residential and temple compounds. Instruments of social control are vividly reflected in sumptuary laws and theories of separate descent for elites and commoners.

The *raison d'être* of the Andean city was not fundamentally economic but political and ideological. Andean cities displayed an intense concern for public symbolism that connected city to hinterland and urban elites to rural commoners. Capitals such as Tiwanaku were the distilled essence of elite belief and the focal point of publicly expressed concepts of universal order. The farms and fields of the countryside provided the model for the relationship between humankind and nature and influenced the design and social order of Andean cities. The symbolic text written into the design of Cuzco and Tiwanaku, for example, attempted to identify or to harmonize the productive (yet potentially destructive) forces of nature with the culturally created order of human society. To understand the nature of Andean cities then, we must first understand the symbolic structure that shaped urban form and invested it with cultural significance and public meaning.

Politics, Religion, and Symbols in Native Andean Cities

The interpenetration of cult and command was expressed visually and conceptually in Andean capitals by the spatio-temporal organization of public shrines and their constituent social groups. The capital of the Inca empire, Cuzco, offers the best example of the in-

terplay of politics, religion, and the built form of the Andean capital (Zuidema 1990). In Cuzco, the social instrument for conceiving and experiencing the interpenetration of cult and command was the *ceque* system, a symbolic sacred landscape of the city—and, by extension, of the Inca empire itself—organized in a complex collection of shrines arrayed along lines of sight. This sacred landscape was central to the Inca people's identity as an ethnic group and to their belief in the right to rule other nations. The system emanated from the temple of Qorikancha, which contained idols of the Inca state cults and incorporated in its interior precincts niches for housing the sacred mummy bundles of Inca royalty.

From the Qorikancha, as from the center, there went out certain lines which the Indians call *ceques*. They formed four parts corresponding to the four royal roads that went out from Cuzco. On each one of those *ceques* were arranged in order the shrines which there were in Cuzco and its district, like stations of holy places, the veneration of which was common to all. Each *ceque* was the responsibility of the *parcialidades* [the Spanish name for groups of people who formed related parts of a larger ethnic whole] and families of the city of Cuzco, from within which came the attendants and servants who cared for the shrines of their *ceque* and saw to offering the established sacrifices at the proper times. (Bernabé Cobo, cited in Rowe 1979)

This remarkable conceptual organization of Cuzco and its environs incorporated 41 directional sight lines, or *ceques*, radiating from the Qorikancha. Along the *ceques* were 328 *huacas* (shrines), places or objects imbued with sacred power. As Cobo notes, different sets of related lineages (*ayllus*) or larger social groups (*parcialidades*) were responsible for maintaining the *huacas* along the *ceque* line designated to that group. Their responsibilities included the offering of ritually prescribed sacrifices at the sacred shrines.

Cuzco's *ceque* system bound together in multiple layers Inca concepts of geographic and symbolic space, time, history, and social organization. Perhaps the most important meaning embedded in the system was reflected in the sidereal-lunar agricultural calendar, in which each of the 328 *huacas* represented one day. Throughout the agricultural cycle, members of at least one of the *parcialidades* resident in Cuzco were engaged in communal rituals to insure abundant harvests and the fertility of the camelid herds. The ceremonies served as a trenchant reminder that the Incas' success as a people destined to rule other nations hinged

on group solidarity and on their ability to sustain a concordance between the social and natural orders.

In Lefebvre's terms, the people of Cuzco conjoined spatial practice, the representation of space, and representational space (that is, space as perceived, conceived, and lived) in a cohesive system. By representational space, Lefebvre specifically means "space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols" (1991:39). Representational space, he continues, "overlays physical space making symbolic use of its objects," just as the *ceque* system and its constellation of shrines overlaid the physical space of Cuzco, investing the urban and rural landscape with cultural and historical meaning. Two salient classes of symbolic associations link the *huacas* arrayed along the ritual *ceque* paths of Cuzco and its environs—water and irrigation, on the one hand, and dynastic lore and "history," on the other (Sherbondy 1982, 1992). Each relates to distinct principles of legitimate authority, a distinction I characterize as the "inside-outside" dichotomy.

The first of these symbolic associations concerns the autochthonous people of Cuzco—the original inhabitants of the valley who were later dominated by the Inca elite. Fully one-third (109) of the *ceque* shrines relate to springs, streams, rivers, and pools that are actually or symbolically sources of flowing water for irrigating adjoining lands. These water-related shrines can be interpreted, in one sense, as markers delimiting and sectioning arable land among various social groups (Sherbondy 1992; Zuidema 1986). Sacrifices made at these shrines emphasize associations with telluric phenomena and with the fertility and genic properties of land fed by flowing water. The principle of legitimate authority expressed by these associations emerges from the rights of the autochthonous populations as the original holders of usufruct title. This is the "inside" pole of my dichotomy—the legitimacy and authority that accrues from original possession.

The second set of symbolic associations of the *ceque* system shrines relates to the event-history of the Inca kings and queens or the royal class as a whole. This "history" includes mythical events relating to the origin accounts of the Inca as a distinct ethnic group and as a royal dynasty that derived its authority from outside the Cuzco environs. It also commemorates significant achievements in the lives of (possibly) historic kings. The commemorative shrines are usually (although not always) located along the paths in the

Chinchaysuyu quarter. Various Inca origin myths, eloquently analyzed by Zuidema in a number of path-breaking papers, emphasize migration and ritualized peregrinations or movements along a vector commemorated by landscape markers.

In one version of the origin myth recorded by Juan de Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui (cited in Zuidema 1990:71), Manco Capac, founder of the Inca dynasty, migrates from Lake Titicaca to Cuzco, conquers the two principal native lords, and appropriates their lands and irrigation waters. Another version recounts the origins of the Inca as an ethnic group and as a royal caste through the emergence of four couples—specifically, four pairs of brothers and sisters—from sacred caves at Pacariqtambo. This is the story of the brothers/sisters Ayaar (Urbano 1981; Zuidema 1990:9–10). After an extended migration north to Cuzco and the magical lithification of several brothers en route, Manco Capac establishes authority over the natives of the valley, again appropriating the lands and waters of Cuzco.

Both versions of the origin myth feature migration from a sacred landscape (Lake Titicaca and sacred caves, each with aqueous, telluric, and fertility associations) to the valley of Cuzco and the subsequent conquest and subordination of indigenous populations. The special sociological characteristic of the first Incas is that they are outsiders; their authority stems from their foreignness and aggressiveness. They are archetypal *sinchis* (warlords). They do not possess legitimate authority but appropriate authority by force. Further, they must assert and reaffirm their authority by continuing peregrinations through the conquered territory. This is the opposite, "outside" pole of my dichotomy—legitimate authority as appropriated or usurped by outsiders. This, of course, is nothing more than the Inca version of Sahlins's "stranger king." As Sahlins remarks of Polynesian kingship:

It is the remarkably common fact that the great chiefs and kings of political society are not the people they rule. By the local theories of origin, they are strangers. . . . Power is not represented here as an intrinsic social condition. It is usurpation, in the double sense of a forceful seizure of sovereignty and a sovereign denial of the prevailing moral order. Rather than a normal succession, usurpation is the principle of legitimacy. (1985:78–80)

At the risk of pushing the comparative interpretation too far, I would argue that this tension between the

two poles of legitimate authority (possessed versus appropriated) lies at the core of archaic states generally, and accounts, at least in part, for the apparent fragility of these traditional state formations.

The *ceque* system was, in some sense, the Inca solution to integrating these opposing forces into a cohering, if not completely coherent, social and symbolic whole. By encapsulating or incorporating (in the case of communities granted the status of Inca-by-privilege) non-Inca groups in the *ceque* system, the Inca, via collaborative, habitual social and spatial practice, effectively glossed over the natural tensions and contradictions that arose from their usurpation of authority. That is to say, conquered and conquerors shared an ideology of worship focused on the *ceque* shrines of Cuzco and its environs. Encoded in this symbolic landscape of shrines were metaphorical and literal referents to the autochthonous inhabitants of the land, who possessed legitimate authority, and to the foreign *sinchis* who, by force-of-arms, usurped and appropriated legitimate authority. This dialectic of the inside-outside principles of authority is encoded in symbolic terms within the Inca-constructed sacred geography of Cuzco.

Although we may perceive a dialectic between opposing principles of authority, this is not a case of equivalency of power in mutual and balanced counterpoint. One of the poles of this dialectic is clearly dominant, the other subordinate. The power and de facto legitimacy of the successful usurper is, by definition, superior to authority derived from original possession, for the autochthonous groups are dislodged and dispossessed of the source of their authority—the exclusive right to irrigate and cultivate their land.

The Inca rulers, like most archaic kings, attempted to perpetuate their legitimacy by reconfiguring social space both in their capitals and in the rural reaches of their domains. They created or modified preexisting centers to publicly proclaim and make tangible the source of their legitimate right to rule. The warlords and their elite cadre of kinsmen, retainers, and clients constructed and inhabited majestic centers accoutered with monumental representations of space they had conceived. The centers were imbued with signs of sacred authority—enormous plazas for public ritual; temples, palaces, and thrones; great urban gardens—all to symbolically expressing the Inca elites' legitimacy. They became dwellers in cities of their own design, and from these cities they circulated in the hin-

terlands, in effect extending the ideological grounds of their created cosmopolitan culture. Lefebvre remarks:

The city state thus establishes a fixed centre by coming to constitute a hub, a privileged focal point, surrounded by peripheral areas which bear its stamp. From this moment on, the vastness of pre-existing space appears to come under the thrall of divine order. At the same time the towns seem to gather in everything which surrounds them, including the natural and divine, and the earth's evil and good forces. As image of the universe (*imago mundi*), urban space is reflected in the rural space that it possesses and indeed in a sense *contains*. Over and above its economic, religious, and political context, therefore, this relationship already embodies an element of symbolism, of image-and-reflection: the town perceives itself in its double, in its repercussions or echo; in self-affirmation, from the height of its towers, its gates, and its campaniles, it contemplates itself in the countryside that it has shaped—that is to say, in its work. The town and its surroundings thus constitute a *texture*. (1991:235; original emphasis)

As Lefebvre recognizes, the city of the archaic state actively shaped its countryside, constructing a fabric of social relations. This shaping proceeded conceptually, symbolically, and materially through commissioned public works, such as the great irrigated agricultural complexes of the Inca, Chimu, and Tiwanaku elites, and through the reorganization of autochthonous populations in the provinces.

As in most agrarian states, particularly those lacking a merchant-market complex (as was the case in the Andes), the intimate and potentially conflictive relationship between city and countryside dominates the political dynamic. This conflict recapitulates the tensions reflected in the inside-outside dichotomy, the uneasy relationship between foreign rulers and autochthonous populations. But how is power extended from city to countryside in the traditional state and in the Andes specifically? How was the principle of appropriated authority transformed into a system of governance?

The Autocratic City and the Patrimonial State

Although the intensity of this city-country relationship varied over time and space in ancient agrarian states, one feature remained constant: the city lived off the surrounding countryside by extracting tribute,

both goods and labor service (the latter appears to have been emphasized in the Andean world). At the same time, the archaic city-state provided reciprocal services—most notably, security and a sense of inclusion in a greater social universe. In other words, the city interjected into the countryside distinct cultural values and opened up new cultural perspectives from those of the circumscribed social landscape of the countryside. Native Andean cities differed from most other preindustrial states in this regard, perhaps because of the lack of “democratizing” forces inherent in a market-based economy.

The cosmopolitan perspective imparted to the rural commoner on pilgrimage to native Andean capitals was limited, controlled, and framed in a discourse of religiosity. Almost certainly there was no intent to encourage migration to the cities. Indeed, there were few economic incentives for rural populations to migrate to the city except as retainers to the ruling lineage. These positions were of limited number, of course, so most of the population remained on the land as agricultural producers. The result was a notable absence of social diversity in the cities.

The Andean capitals, particularly the capitals of the expansionist states (Cuzco, Chan Chan, and Tiwanaku are three paradigmatic cases) were autocratic in terms of both politics and social composition. A brief passage from Pedro Sancho de la Hoz, one of the first Spaniards to see Cuzco before its destruction, testifies to this special character:

Cuzco, because it is the capital city and residence of the Inca nobles, is large enough and handsome enough to compare with any Spanish city. It is full of the palaces of magnates, for in it reside no poor folk. Each of these Inca magnates, as well as all the *curacas*, erect there dwellings, although they do not permanently occupy them. (cited in Brundage 1967:8)

I would argue that similar patterns were expressed at other Andean capitals such as Chan Chan and Tiwanaku.

At the same time, these capitals served as a fulcrum for mediating the conflicts between elites and commoners, city and countryside, that constantly threatened to erupt. As Lefebvre remarks, “The town—urban space—has a symbiotic relationship with that of rural space over which (often with much difficulty) it holds sway” (1991:234–235). But what was the political and economic articulation of this symbolic interconnectedness? How did the capitals “hold sway,”

however tenuously, over their tributary hinterlands in the Andean world?

First, it is important to understand that the relationship between such states and local communities is not invariably oppressive and extractive. The two entities are always counterpoised in a dynamic of mutualism. Centralized states exert directive control over regional economies and impinge on the autonomy of local communities, but they also introduce local communities into more inclusive social and economic worlds. They create dynamic interconnections among diverse communities, accelerating local economic development. In turn, by identifying themselves as the agents of development, states derive legitimacy, prestige, and intensification of their social power (Ludden 1985, in press). The centralization of authority in traditional states does not invariably imply bureaucratization, however. We can easily conceive a broad spectrum of institutional possibilities for the expression and exercise of authority operating simultaneously in early state societies, a spectrum that ran from localized relations of kinship to relations framed around consensual or coerced associations between rulers and subject populations.

In many respects, governance in the native Andean state turned on what Weber called “patrimonial” authority, which he contrasted with formal bureaucratic states:

Permanent agencies, with fixed jurisdiction, are not the historical rule but rather the *exception*. This is even true of large political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic, and Mongolian empires of conquest, and of many feudal states. In all these cases, the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees, table-companions, or court-servants. Their commissions and powers are not precisely delimited and are temporarily called into being in each case. (1978:1006; original emphasis)

In the case of states like the Inca and Tiwanaku, permanent agencies with distinct jurisdictions never emerged at all or were only weakly developed in the formal network of command.

In Weber’s concept of the fully modern bureaucracy, the power of the state is exercised through a system of formal rules applied without reference to the actors’ social personae and statuses. This kind of abstract regulation of state affairs is alien to the native states of the Americas and probably to most archaic states of the world. But the absence of a rationalizing

theory of public administration does not necessarily imply arbitrary, ad hoc exercise of power, the abrogation of power to local authorities, or less centralization of authority.

One of Weber’s prime examples of patrimonial authority elaborated into an expansive state formation was Pharaonic Egypt. (He also mentions the Inca in passing.) Weber comments that all the subject territories and populations of Pharaonic Egypt might be considered “a single tremendous *oikos* ruled patrimonially by the pharaoh” (1978:1013; *oikos* here refers to the authoritarian household of a prince or manorial lord; see Weber 1978:381). As Wheatley notes, one of the characteristics of patrimonial authority conceived by Weber was that the ruler (the supreme patriarch, as it were) “treats all political administration as his personal affair, while the officials, appointed by the ruler on the basis of his personal confidence in them, in turn regard their administrative operations as a personal service to their ruler in the context of duty and respect” (1971:52). With respect to the obligations of the subject populations:

In the patrimonial state the most fundamental obligation of the subjects is the material maintenance of the ruler, just as is the case in the patrimonial household; again the difference is only one of degree. At first, this provisioning takes the form of honorary gifts and of support in special cases, in accordance with the spirit of intermittent political action. However, with the increasing continuity and rationalization of political authority, their obligations became more and more comprehensive. (Weber 1978:1014)

Thus the fundamental lineaments of patrimonial authority derive from sentiments of personal obligation reinforced by tradition. Subjects’ obligations to a ruler may be either coerced or consensual, or they may derive from kinship relations. Consanguineal bonds of kinship within dynastic lines, affinal, indirect, remote, or fictive kinship ties, voluntary association or attachment to royal lineages (mutualism), or violent subjugation and incorporation of subject populations were all pathways for establishing personal obligations and social links between rulers and subjects.

Weber correctly recognized, however, that the principal strut undergirding the patrimonial authority of a ruler (originally identified with military action—i.e., the power that accrues to a warlord) was “a consensual community which also exists apart from his independent military force and which is rooted in the belief that the ruler’s powers are legitimate insofar as

they are *traditional*” (1978:1020; original emphasis). The importance of this insight cannot be underestimated, for it introduces the role of ideology in the construction of authority and the emergence of hierarchically organized societies. In a similar vein, Godelier notes that “the power of domination consists of two indissoluble elements whose combination constitutes its strength: violence and consent, [but] of these two components of power, the stronger is not the violence of the dominant, but the consent of the dominated to their domination” (1978:767). Ideology as a shared belief system assumes a central position in maintaining the consent—or better, the acquiescence—of the dominated social classes to a hierarchical social order.

Given this construction, why would a dominated class consent to actively participate in a belief system that serves the interests of an elite, dominating class? Godelier’s solution to this conundrum makes great sense: participation in the society-wide belief system enhanced the economic interests of the dominated class. Specifically, he hypothesized that an elite ideology that reifies hierarchical relations of dominance and exploitation could only be promoted and perpetuated if these relations were cast in the form of an exchange of services between the elite and the dominated. The precise form of the exchange may vary, but in the case of early agrarian-based states, the emerging elite class probably offered esoteric knowledge of the supernatural realm, of “invisible realities and forces controlling (in the thought of these societies) the reproduction of the universe and of life” in exchange for the supplementary labor (Godelier 1978:767). Other, more pragmatic services that an elite class could have offered to commoners were articulation of agricultural calendars, adjudication of boundary disputes, maintenance of security, management of redistribution networks, administration of social and economic links among diverse local communities, and the like.

Still, as Godelier acknowledges, even if dominated classes share the system of political and economic ideas, beliefs, and symbols promulgated by a dominant class, the threat of coercion hovers in the background. It may be that the most successful class-stratified societies arrived at an appropriate balance of force and persuasion. Unmitigated terror leads, in time, to divisiveness, disgust, and revolt; ideological propaganda unreinforced by the potential for sanctions leads, in time, to fragmentation and dissolution of the hierarchical social order.

Hierarchy in patrimonial state offices emerges first in the context of the tightly inbred world of the king's *oikos*. In a social environment in which personal obligation and fealty are the *sine qua non* of office, the ruler turns first to his kinsmen and immediate dependents to create a body of administrative officials. These dependents, even though they may have conflicted loyalties of their own (or, for the more highly placed, strategies for usurping princely authority for themselves) are more easily manipulated because they usually reside at court (the extended household of the king). But as Weber implies, the expansion of authority beyond a local domain increases administrative burdens to a point where the ruler must recruit officials "in an extrapatrimonial fashion" (1978:1026). In this way, inner and outer circles of officials develop.

These inner and outer "courts" perform similar administrative functions on behalf of the king's expanding *oikos*, but they exhibit differential access and degrees of dependency to the ruler. The task of the king in this environment of political intrigue and competition for influence is to maintain sufficient personal contact with subordinates and clients to reinforce the bonds of personal loyalty and dependence. Personal contact and public demonstrations of reciprocity in the form of gift exchange, hosting of banquets, and the like were the life's blood of this kind of politico-administrative system.

Given that personal contact and public appearance were essential to the legitimacy of leadership, it is not surprising to learn that the king in patrimonial states was often itinerant and that his court moved with him (see, for instance, Briant [1988] on the "nomadic" Achaemenid kings and Keightley [1983a] on the itinerant kings of Shang period China). The mobile residential complexes of the kings were imposing, majestic, and infused with the symbols of earthly and divine power, but it was the traveling court that constituted the true focus of authority, a capital in motion with the king at its center. And it was explicitly from the person of the king that power emanated.

The itinerant capitals were, in a sense, simulacra of the fixed capital, consciously wrought as awe-inspiring images of sacred and secular authority. The royal capitals, fixed or itinerant, were frequently designed as microcosmic representations of the state, and cosmograms as well—condensed reflections of the order of the humanly perceived universe. The itinerant king moved with all the symbols of his power and with the images of the empire's gods: the gods, the king, and the cosmos traveled as one.

We know from sixteenth-century documentary sources that Inca kings were constantly in motion. They struck out with glittering retinues of warriors, priests, and camp followers in battle campaigns, on elaborate tours of their provinces, on ritually prescribed peregrinations to sacred shrines. Some were absent from Cuzco for years at a time, which raises an interesting question about the role of Cuzco as an administrative center. Apparently, administration of the Inca empire was effected by the coterie of kinsmen and dependents clustered around the moving court, in concert with the "patrimonial officials" resident in the provinces. As was the case with the kings of other archaic empires, however, the Inca's grasp on power was tenuous. Like the great Darius, forcefully dispossessed of kingship by Alexander, the Inca king Atahualpa, on an extended tour through his realm, lost command when the Spanish took him captive in his itinerant capital on November 16, 1532.

Predatory, expansionist patrimonial states, such as Pharaonic Egypt and the Inca, develop highly differentiated patrimonial offices, defined hierarchically by their degree of relatedness to the paramount ruler. The political coin of the realm, as it were, becomes the ability to demonstrate one's real or fictive kinship ties with the ruler. The highly differentiated offices function, in effect, as a proto-bureaucracy in which the language of authority is voiced in the idiom of kinship. This "bureaucratization" of patrimonial office leads to the emergence of new status groups—cohorts of local lords and state clients—with a common desire for recognition and representation at the court of the ruler. The local lords, in turn, operate from a politico-economic base that recapitulates the structural forms of the ruler's *oikos*. They compete to form their own independent or quasi-independent patrimonial estates, through which they extend their influence and control over local populations. They frequently seek to appropriate the religious mystique of the ruler by replicating the architecture and symbolic configuration of the ruler's capital.

The geopolitical landscape of the patrimonial state consists of congeries of petty polities coalesced around the households of local lords, linked only tenuously, if at all, but merged administratively into the *oikos* of the paramount ruler. That is to say, political, social, and administrative linkages in such a state structure are strong vertically but weak or incompletely developed horizontally. The personalized, centralizing nature of ultimate authority in such a structure results in the weakening or disintegration of

"natural" affinities within ethnic and other traditional groups in favor of opportunistic gravitation toward the court of the ruler.

Inspired by Weberian categories, I have characterized this geopolitical landscape in the Andean world as a "*hyper-oikos*" (Kolata 1983:367). By this I meant that the economy and political influence of the paramount ruler's household extended far beyond the capital's circumscribed hinterland. The agents of that extension were the elites who governed the provincial settlements. These aristocratic managers were directly or symbolically related to members of the royal household, and they worked to further the economic and political ends of that household. This is the meaning behind the political device of installing "Incas by privilege." The *hyper-oikos* was a technique for building an empire by integrating an elite class in an extensive fictive kinship system. The elites were bound by a complex, elaborate network of privilege and obligation that was manipulated by the royal household.

The *hyper-oikos* was essentially an extension of the imperial household ruled through a network of client states and local lords by subtle suasion through the force of sacred tradition and by the implicit threat of physical retaliation for rebellion. Yates comes to similar conclusions with respect to archaic Chinese states such as the Shang (this volume). Webster's analysis of the Classic period Maya city-states is also consistent with this interpretation (this volume), although Maya political structure and geopolitical influence appear more fragmented and weakly integrated than that of the Inca, Tiwanaku, or—for that matter—Shang states.

Conclusions

Many, if not all, Andean states operated with patrimonial principles of authority, political systems that can be characterized as organizationally centralized but nonbureaucratic. What are the implications of these principles of authority for Andean urban structure, form, and meaning? I have already signaled some of them. Andean cities were not venues of a flourishing merchant class. There were no free artisans and craftsmen organized into guilds that could exert pressure on municipal authorities. There were no commercial transactions in the modern sense of disinterested buyers and sellers brought together in a marketplace. There was no broad-based, public participation in the political life of the city, as we see—

or imagine as an ideal—in the archetypal city-state, the *polis* of Greece, especially Athens (Morris, this volume), the exemplar of urban "democracy."

Moral, political, and military authority in the Andean capital flowed from the ruling lineages and their coterie of kin, fictive kin, retainers, and camp followers. The capitals, perhaps to a greater degree than urban centers in other parts of the preindustrial world, were autocratic, built for and dominated by a native aristocracy. In this sense, Andean capitals were truly patrician cities—places for symbolically concentrating the political and religious authority of the elites. Andean capitals boasted little in the way of pluralism and social heterogeneity, although these were not entirely absent.

The *raison d'être* of Andean capitals was servicing aristocratic lineages and their entourages. The city was an extension of the elite households and a public expression of their religious and secular authority. Its residents were attached in one way or another to the economic, political, and social needs of the royal households. The city was shaped by the religious and political mystique of the elite, wielded in premeditated self-interest, not the invisible hand of the marketplace.

Andean capitals were small by modern standards—the permanent populations of Chan Chan and Tiwanaku probably never exceeded 25,000–30,000 and may have been much smaller (Moseley 1975; Kolata 1993). Cuzco's central core held no more than 15,000–20,000 residents, although the population of the entire metropolitan district may have approached 50,000 (Agurto 1980). Chan Chan, Tiwanaku, and Cuzco were among the largest cities to emerge in the prehispanic Andean world. Secondary cities were smaller: few ever reached 10,000 inhabitants, and most were in the 3,000–5,000 range. In contrast, the hinterlands were thickly settled, reflecting the fact that the fundamental work of Andean states was rural, not urban.

In some senses, Andean society was nonurban, perhaps even antiurban, in orientation. Unlike the preindustrial metropolises of Europe, which acted as magnets for the surrounding countryfolk, there was little economic incentive and virtually no opportunity for rural dwellers to migrate to Andean cities, since the right to reside in these regal-ritual cities was tied to a relationship with patrician lineages. The inherent structural limitations of this kind of patron-client relationship, which demands face-to-face contact, limited the scale and diversity of social relations. Lacking

the democracy and entrepreneurial opportunity that comes with a market, Andean capitals were essentially "company towns" catering to the interpenetrating businesses of state religion and elite politics.

Given the special role of Andean cities, it is not surprising that native Andean states exhibit a low degree of urbanization. There were never many urban settlements extant at one time. Furthermore, the cities that did emerge exhibited extremely low diversity in structural type. In many respects, Andean states were not polystructural urban cultures at all. Rather, they were polities dominated by elite cities of similar structure. This can, of course, be claimed to a lesser degree of

Rome and other preindustrial states as well, but the Andean case is notable for the recursive replication of scale, sociological composition, and cultural meaning of these cities across time and space. In contrast to the Roman case, for instance, no trading colonies grew to be self-sustaining urban settlements; no frontier garrisons emerged as politically autonomous cities. It is as if there was in the prehispanic Andean world a single social and cognitive template for urban structure and significance, and this template drew its ultimate meaning from elite self-representation poised against the socially undifferentiated masses that populated the rural reaches of this world.