2 Sociolinguistic Regimes and the Management of “Diversity”

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INTRODUCTION

For the European Union (hereafter EU), language diversity constitutes a key contradiction. On the one hand, the EU supports linguistic diversity in its own workings and among member states that rely on linguistic distinctions for their legitimacy. On the other hand, territorially organized linguistic diversity is an obstacle to another EU commitment: maximum mobility of labor, production and commodities across the continent to achieve advantages in global markets. The EU is a new kind of economic and increasingly a political organization. Its expansion is in part a response to the recent intensification of global capitalism. Yet, despite its much-remarked novelty as an organizational form, the language ideologies the EU is promulgating—in which tropes of “pride” and “profit” play a central role—are strikingly similar to those developed by European nation-states over the last century and a half.

Such continuity within a new organizational structure and in novel economic circumstances would be surprising if processes of late capitalism directly impacted linguistic practices and policies. But they do not. Rather, the tropes and frames—the language ideologies—discussed in this volume mediate between political economy and linguistic practices. Furthermore, the present chapter argues that ideologies of language have a semiotic organization and a history of their own that do not simply reproduce the logic and history of capital. They must be examined as a distinct order of phenomena, with their own dynamic, so that we can understand their mediating role. Accordingly, the goal of this chapter is to explicate the semiotic organization of “pride” and “profit” as terms in an axis of differentiation that allocates contrasting values to linguistic forms. With that understanding, we can return to examine EU policies and see why they seem so familiar and how to interpret the forms of change that become apparent.

Today, in European discourses of “pride,” language is framed as a cultural treasure, exemplary of tradition, usually a national tradition. In discourses of “profit,” the value of language is framed in narrower economic terms, as a means to material gain. This particular contrast is historically specific. But a comparative look at sociolinguistic arrangements in the world shows that the linkage of language to contrasting values is very widespread.
For example, in precolonial Java, *alus* and *kasar*—translatable as “smooth” and “rough”—were values that distinguished and ranked linguistic forms and forms of personhood (Errington 1988; Geertz 1960). These too constituted an axis of differentiation. In the Wolof villages of Senegal, the major axis of differentiation is perhaps best termed “restraint” vs. “volatility” (Irvine 1990), with nobles seen as more restrained than griots. It is among such distinctions that we should place “pride”/“profit.” As Heller and Duchêne (this volume) note, a discourse of profit does not replace or simply interrupt discourses of pride, rather “the two are intertwined in complex ways.” I argue that for this pair—as for the others—a semiotic process defines how they are intertwined, thereby significantly shaping the ways speakers, social movements and political economic forces mobilize these contrasts, appropriate them for their own purposes or contest and try to undermine them.

To be sure, the contrast here summarized as “pride”/“profit” differs from others not only in the qualities and values picked out as poles of differentiation, but also in that it arose in the context of commercial markets and has been swept up in the history of capitalism. But the similarities are equally important: those living in a capitalist political economy come to presuppose and naturalize “profit” and “pride” and to see these as self-evidently contrasting values, with linguistic entailments, just as those in, say, a Javanese settlement assumed that human essences were composed of certain contrasting qualities. In both we should attend to semiotic properties of the following kind.

As elements in an ideology of differentiation, “pride” and “profit” are co-constituted: they define each other. Like other axes of differentiation, this one also includes many strands of parallel contrasts. Each pole of the axis is indexed by linguistic forms that are also understood to contrast. The linguistic forms that index the values (and associated person types or situation types) are discursively constituted as iconic of them. For example, Wolof speakers whose speech is heard by coparticipants as ebullient are understood to be expressive, not simply to be speaking that way. Most importantly for my purposes, there is a characteristic form of change imagined in such ideologies: fractal recursion. An opposition, salient at some level of relationship, can be projected onto other levels. “Thus the dichotomizing and partitioning process that was involved in some understood opposition . . . recurs at other levels, creating either subcategories on each side of a contrast or supercategories that include both sides but oppose them to something else” (Irvine and Gal 2000, 38; see also Gal and Irvine 1995). When one opposition is institutionalized or otherwise fixed, previous iterations are often erased or forgotten. In this way, ideologies of differentiation construct partial and perspectival visions of sociolinguistic worlds, highlighting some values and denying others (Woolard 1998).

This semiotic process has made the “pride”/“profit” distinction available as a means of differentiating linguistic practices. The contrasts thus created
have, in turn, been harnessed to formulate, motivate, justify or explain emerging struggles in social relations. Elite writers as much as ordinary speakers have relied on this multipart process to mediate between capitalist political economic arrangements and linguistic practices. The process itself both provides routes for change and enables the possibility of veiling change in the cloth of familiar continuity.

The chapter has three sections. The first emphasizes the long-standing existence of “pride”/“profit” as an axis of differentiation by examining its early construction and the elements out of which it was assembled. By the eighteenth century, literary men in Europe had created contrasting genres of writing, each associated with one of these two values, in an attempt to understand an emerging market society and rank their own positions within it. I offer illustrations of the semiotics of differentiation over several centuries. The ideas of “profit” and market rationality were linked to notions of self-interest and an impersonal, timeless, placeless, universal realm. Juxtaposed to this were concepts of particularity and emplacement of selves, passion and tradition. The valences attached to these ideas changed repeatedly over the centuries. In addition, contrasts were fractally reiterated and their codependence was repeatedly erased, then recuperated, as they were used to argue for diverse political and economic goals.

The second section jumps to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to show that strands of the same contrasting values were central to the process of monolingual standardization. The evidence comes from elite discourses about the ranking of speech forms and the enactment of those hierarchies in social institutions. The same values that earlier organized genres of writing were extended to differentiate linguistic registers (often recasting regional dialects). As the values were hierarchically arranged, so were the registers and people types that were indexically associated with them. The formation and legitimation of European nation-states depended in part on monolingual standardization, a sociolinguistic regime. That familiar story needs no repetition here. Rather, I point illustratively to the role played by ideologies of differentiation in that project.

That monolingual regime was hegemonic in Europe for over a century. Evidence from a selection of EU documents suggests that a second phase of standardization is now underway to make multilingualism the dominant ideal, an attempt to conceptually arrange and thereby manage the EU’s increasing linguistic “diversity.” The EU’s existing contradictions as a suprastate organization in late capitalism are exacerbated by eastern expansion, the revitalization of regional languages, the presence of migrants’ languages from all over the globe and the increasing use of English and other languages of worldwide distribution. Yet, the move to valorize multilingualism is not a grand change of sociolinguistic regime. It is rather the redeployment of the same value distinction—in a fractal recursion—now indexed not by linguistic registers but by multiple standardized languages. This, I argue, is how the current regime seems familiar, despite change.
Finally, a third section stays in the twentieth century but moves from elite discourses to the linguistic activities of speakers as described in ethnographic reports. I show that, even when reacting against EU policies, speakers are mobilizing the same axis of differentiation and the semiotic process outlined here. My examples include evidence from the eastern European members of the EU, for whom the current standardization of multilingualism, though billed as inclusive, has effects similar to the standardizations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, contributing to a restratification of the population along lines of linguistic skill and the reproduction on these new grounds of western advantage.

HISTORIES OF CATEGORY DIFFERENTIATION

The historical sketches in this section show that conceptual categories display dynamics separate from the political economic processes in which they participate. These quick histories also give a glimpse of how the current contrasts forming the axis of differentiation summarized as “pride” and “profit” were put together, over a long stretch of time, out of heterogeneous conceptual elements.

Scholars are currently reexamining the set of conceptual modes labeled European “modernity.” This includes the broad configuration in which “pride” and “profit” are embedded, and out which they emerged in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. These re-readings are inflected by disciplinary differences. Given disparate points of departure, it is noteworthy that many scholars—over several decades—have retold the histories of the foundational concepts in ways that recall the complex semiotic process of differentiation outlined previously. They show how concepts/terms and the values associated with them emerged together; one category was defined as what the other was not. Yet, practices relegated to one category were invariably—if less visibly—crucial in the other. In short, these categories were co-constitutive. There is also a focus on the linguistic practices that indexed the contrasting values. Most importantly, cultural and intellectual histories illustrate the way the opposed concepts/terms were iterated in recursions—reapplications of the co-constitutive contrast—thereby creating more differentiations or unifying concepts into larger oppositions. Four works and the processes of conceptual development they describe will give a sense of these patterns in the emergence of the multistranded “pride”/“profit” contrast.

Agnew’s (1986) intellectual history chronicles social relations in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English theaters and markets, two institutions that in an earlier period shared spaces and personae. He describes the way theaters and markets came to be separated and contrasted as counterbalanced forms of expression, exchange and interaction. As market transactions were understood to involve the abstract roles of buyer and seller
that united widely disparate moments in time and great spatial distances, so nonmarket social relations were simultaneously identified as specifically located or emplaced and tied to the particularities of individual selves. Agnew draws a parallel between this cultural conception and the claim, made by Wordsworth and Coleridge at the start of the nineteenth century, that literary art, and especially poetry, constituted a different sort of value than the (monetary) value found in markets: more a matter of individual genius, craft and sentiment. With this argument, poets attempted to elevate their own social position. Calling poetry “priceless” was a claim to set its value apart and higher than money, to be sure, but also higher than other kinds of writing.

We see in Agnew’s descriptions a process of creating separate realms each with its own characteristic forms of expression (theater and market), and the fractal reiteration of that distinction many decades later within the realm of literary production, so that poetry is made to seem even more distinct from market forms of expression than are other literary works. Ironically, of course, books were commodities and in that role not at all separate from markets. They were dependent on markets for their materiality (paper, printing) and distribution. In addition, they were sold and thus had market value. Strikingly, we see the erasure of the original co-constitution of market and theater, and the erasure of what we (if not contemporaries) can see as the market principles at play in the literary world supposedly farthest from market value.

Dealing with different materials, Poovey (2008) makes a parallel argument in literary history. She traces the emergent divisions among forms of writing that were all considered fairly similar in seventeenth-century Britain, but vastly different by the end of the eighteenth century. Economic and literary genres came to be seen as instantiating different values, as in Agnew’s story. Economic writing was seen as mathematically regular, abstract and therefore rational, with universal claims. Literary writing, by contrast, relied on individual craft, originality, feeling and aesthetics. By the nineteenth century, the two sorts of writers, especially in London, began to see their works as directly opposed—novels vs. financial commentary, romances vs. political economic explanations. They also saw themselves as similarly contrasted. Economic writers seemed more numerate and rational than the others, in what we would now call an iconic relation to their written products. Poovey argues these contrasts came to be “two models of value, models that seem to have almost nothing in common” (2008, 417). This result rests on significant erasures: forgetting their joint origins and their codefinition, but also the fact that they used many of the same rhetorical methods (see McCloskey 1985) and dealt with much the same subject matter: life in capitalism.

An account of western European political theory echoes the distinctions of value chronicled by Agnew and Poovey, yet adds to our understanding of this multistranded contrast by showing how human motivation
was imagined to be arrayed along what in this volume we are calling the “pride”/“profit” axis. Hirschman’s (1977) classic essay draws on writings in French, English, Italian and German, analyzing the “political arguments for capitalism before its triumph.” He tracks how “passion” and “interest”—in today’s terms, emotions and economic instrumentalities—came to be contrasted and opposed in European scholarly debates. By attending to the changing semantics of words in the most influential political and economic writing of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, he also shows how they came to be seen as particular and universal.

Reason had long been contrasted to the passions, but the passions—avarice, pride, lust, ambition for glory—were thought to be more negative and more powerful. Scholars applied the distinction between passion and reason to subdivide the passions. Among the passions, avarice was redefined as a quiet, reasonable passion. It gained the label “interest.” As Hirschman shows, this allowed thinkers in the eighteenth century to posit that “interest,” having been derived from avarice, but tamed by reason, would be strong enough to control the more destructive passions in a way reason could not (1977, 43). Passions varied by time and individual whim, but “interest,” the “desire for gain,” came to be considered “a universal . . . which operates at all times, in all places and in all persons” (Hume, cited in Hirschman 1977, 54). The origin of the “interest” category was erased, as interest was seen as diametrically opposed to passions/emotions in subsequent centuries. There were many political economic considerations in the invention of the concept of “interest” in the eighteenth century, and writers differed in their use of it. But the logic of intellectual debate played a crucial part.

My final example is an intellectual history about European philosophies of language. Read along with the others, Bauman and Briggs’s work (2003) shows how a timeline stretching from an imagined tradition to modernity became part of the axis of differentiation we have been tracking, modernity aligned with supposedly universal time, place and interest, and tradition aligned with the particularities of emotion/passion, creativity and specificity in time and place. Philosophies about what language is, and how it should operate, framed and thus underwrote this multistranded differentiation of value and allocated to the contrasted poles not only linguistic genres, but also features of language in general.

Bauman and Briggs use Locke and Herder as figureheads to represent two approaches to language that they show were developed in tandem—in our terms co-constituted—in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Lockean approaches saw denotation as the key function of language, arguing that ambiguity, the “cheat and abuse of words,” was like the clipping of precious metal from English coinage that threatened profit and hence political stability (Appelby 1992). Fixing the meanings of words would reduce political and economic deception. To stabilize meaning, language should be made maximally transparent in denotation. Similarly, the credibility of
texts should not depend on their relation to earlier texts—as in medieval appeals to precedential authority—but only on how faithfully words and texts, seen as autonomous from society, represent the observable world.

More than a century later, Herder rejected this separation of language from culture and society. Instead, he saw language, and especially poetic form, as the key to tradition: a sedimentation of the sociocultural past in the present. While Locke posited language as a universal human faculty, Herder looked for the “differences that make [men] what they are, make them themselves, it is in these that the individual genius of men and cultures is expressed” (Berlin 1997 [1960], 15). We see here the conjunction of several strands in the distinctions already discussed. Herder’s appreciation of other cultures and his demand for pride in the German language (vis-à-vis French and Latin) were sources for the later study of cultural particularity, the construction of the concept of tradition as an object of reflection and the revalorization of “passion” as a positive value. Bauman and Briggs go on to provide examples of what one can call recursions in which the contrasts between broadly Lockean views and Herderian views were reproduced within a Herderian framework. The Grimm brothers used the tools of a positivist science to investigate poetic traditions that could be constituted as objects of study only within a Herderian approach.

All four works show that elites ranked the values and linguistic practices they formulated, creating hierarchies among people types via their typical linguistic practices. Most people were not credited with rational, accurately representational speech, so Lockean assessments justified hierarchy: rural people, lower classes and women could not exercise reason. Herderian conceptions also justified hierarchy: tradition had its source in the Volk, who were middle class or landed peasants, not women and lower classes (2003, 184–185). Yet the two approaches were unified in creating yet another level of hierarchy—a recursion “up”—a more encompassing distinction: only those with reason and reflexivity could judge linguistic accuracy on the one hand, and safeguard authentic tradition on the other (2003, 193). Although they created distinct philosophies about language’s role in political reform, both approaches identified a stratum of the educated, who were to be the arbiters of modernity in the realm of language; both posited an ideal uniformity in language as the foundation of politics, though one ideal rested on individual reason, the other on group culture. In time, both strands were harnessed to formulate and justify the conceptual underpinnings of nation-states.

DIVERSITY AND ITS STANDARDIZATION

My discussion so far has relied on intellectual and cultural histories to trace the long-term emergence of discourses that defined the axis of differentiation summarized here as “pride” and “profit.” The project of monolingual
language standardization that swept Europe in the nineteenth century was a key site for enactment of these distinctions. It allocated values to specific speech forms that had not yet been regimented in this way. Notwithstanding the nineteenth century’s “sentimentalization” of “mother tongues” (Ahlzweg 1994) and the connotation of uniformity in a term like “standard,” recent scholarship sees standardization as an ideological project of differentiation and hierarchization.

Early studies were more focused on the technology of standardization, in policy and implementation. The process seemed to be (a) selection or invention of a linguistic variety as a source of norms; (b) codification of the norms; (c) elaboration of norms, especially in literature but also in signage, schooling and government; (d) building prestige for the norms; and (e) acceptance of the norms by a significant portion of a community for a significant portion of daily activities. Classic sociological works have linked this standardization to nationalism and the political project of building nation-states. They suggested that print markets, the demands of industrialization and general education have been motor forces behind both nation-states and language standardization (e.g., Anderson 1991 [1983]; Gellner 1983).

More recent work has emphasized that standardization became politically potent because it was an ideological project that naturalized the differentiation and hierarchical ordering of linguistic forms making them the justification for differential ranking of speakers, often those who were otherwise united by a shared and supposedly emotional connection to a mother tongue. Linguistic difference became the naturalized sign connecting political and economic changes to lived understandings of those changes (Bourdieu 1991; Inoue 2006; Silverstein 1996). The specific differences signaled through standardization in Europe—and later more broadly—were the ones arrayed on the multistranded axis we have been examining.

To be sure, sociolinguistic literature has long recognized that linguistic forms index these contrasts: speakers consider one variant to be intimately authentic, the other economically useful; one “emotional” the other “instrumental”; one used at home, the other at work. The newer studies insist, however, that these values are not mere reflexes of the uses to which speakers put their repertoires. Speakers’ valuations are evidence, not explanation. The co-constitution and contrast of values, and the indexical link between linguistic forms and values, are discursive formulations and institutional achievements. Actual usage does not adhere to such schemes. It relies on them as models, speaker types to be voiced or mobilized for particular purposes in specific contexts.

The innovation introduced by standardization was the extension of an old schema that categorized genres to conceptualize and organize linguistic registers. As a sociolinguistic regime, standardization lends value and meaning to one register (the standard) by making it the index of the universal/“profit” pole of this axis of differentiation, while other registers
are demoted with reference to the first, but gain a different kind of value as indexes of particular places, times or identities. Not just anyone can speak these; they are often ethnic emblems. The standard register, in contrast, is supposedly independent of place, time or speaker identity; it is “for everyone,” a “voice from nowhere.” Boasting wide communicative reach, the standard register indexes economic interests. It promises “profit” in the form of upward mobility via widespread contacts or in the labor market (Gal and Woolard 2001; Woolard 2008). Particularity is often overridden by the universal; this is the characteristic form of value hierarchy that standardization creates.

In enactments of co-constitutive values, the perspective of the observer is crucial, setting the parameter of comparison. This is because reiterations—fractal recursions—can proliferate at many levels of contrast. A focus on the “pride” pole can re-create the “profit”/“pride” contrast inside the “pride” category. When compared to national standards, regional languages index particular places and traditions; they signal “pride.” Creating a standard register in a regional language recreates the particular/universal distinction within the category of the particular, making some regional linguistic forms doubly particular. The nonstandard regional forms sound like the local forms of an already particular language. More hierarchies are created within what was thought to be a unified regional form. Gaining universal values for a regional language requires downplaying the palpable authenticity pole, at least within the region (Woolard 2008).

Viewed in a different comparative context, the national standards seem to combine the opposed values. By invoking an international world of many standard languages, the universal/particular contrast can be projected to a wider realm: each standard comes to signal a particular location and national past in that wider world (Gal 2006). Standards are a universal form from the narrower state perspective, yet indexical of place, authenticity and tradition from a more encompassing one. Focusing on one view or perspective tends to erase the other. Yet, as we will see, a suprastate institution creates the social site that more firmly anchors an overarching perspective.

A Europe of (New) Standards

It is within the history of regimented registers that the responses to increasing linguistic diversity by the EU must be analyzed. They seem very familiar, yet not quite the same. The semiotic process of differentiation I have been outlining provides one route into understanding this continuity-in-change—what has changed, what has been reproduced and with what repercussions.

Over the years, repeated statements from various organs of the EU—the Council, the Parliament, other EU bodies, some member states—have declared support for “linguistic diversity,” despite the norm of monolingualism. An NGO to address such issues—the Bureau for Lesser Used Languages—was financed as early as 1982. Yet, the EU does not make
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binding language policy. The founding principle of “subsidiarity” stipulates that primary responsibility for the maintenance and support of national, regional and minority languages legally resides at member state or regional levels. Nevertheless, there has been EU support for such programs, mostly as part of community development efforts (Grin and Moring 2002, 2–3). Thus, the EU is committed to linguistic diversity, but, as we will see, the meaning of this term is in motion.

The evidence analyzed here derives from a series of reports about language issues financed and prepared by order of the European Commission at roughly ten-year intervals—1986, 1996, 2008—with a focus on the most recent one. Scholars from relevant disciplines prepared the reports; they combine historical, demographic and archival research with surveys and interviews; they end with analyses and recommendations. The European Commission is the EU’s executive body, responsible for proposing legislation, developing plans and strategies, and executing these, including the deployment of funds. This makes it a powerful office. In contrast to the European Council that represents governments, and the European Parliament that is an elected body representing citizens, only the Commission is said to have a mandate to “think European,” that is, to plan and execute EU-wide goals. The reports I analyze do not set policy, nor do they represent the opinion of the Commission. They are merely high points, spaced over two decades, in an ocean of writing about language within and around the EU. Yet, as informational documents requested by and prepared for the influential Commission, they both shape and reflect discourses in an elite context of scholars and administrators.

Reading the reports as instances of language ideology, I draw attention to two points: the first is the changing object of study; the second is the changing way moral and financial support for various “kinds” of languages has been formulated and justified. What are the principles and values that implicitly authorize claims? What model of future speakers is implied or recommended in these reports? How are these linked to differentiation and ranking?

Tellingly, the first report (Simone et al. 1986) concerns the definition of “linguistic minority.” Legal, economic, political, cultural, demographic and historical definitions are all found to be inadequate. The authors stress the political delicacy of the issue. They adopt as their model and guide the terms of international agreements that closed the First and Second World Wars and the subsequent argumentation by the United Nations (see Duchêne 2008). The second report (Nelde et al. 1996), less concerned with legalities, provides new evidence about speakers, their usage, age structure, literary and mass media efforts, and defines its object as “those autochthonous communities whose languages are not the official languages of their respective states.” (Nelde et al. 1996, i). These authors also point to a historical process: “[M]inoritization of languages . . . the concept of minority by reference to language groups does not refer to empirical measures, but rather,
to issues of power” (Nelde et al. 1996: 1; see also Williams 2005: 1–21). Subsequent reports write less about “linguistic minorities” than “regional and minority languages” (Grin and Moring 2002, 2, 51, 53, my emphasis). This is a shift in focus that makes fewer assumptions about speakers, their multilingualism, compact geographic location, origins, autochthony, cohesion, community, and relations to nation-states.

The 2008 “Final Report of the High-Level Group on Multilingualism” diverges strikingly from the previous two documents. It does not deal with minorities or even languages but with “multilingualism.” To be sure, that label fits most speakers of “regional and minority languages.” But it also includes migrants entering the EU, adults and students traveling within the EU for work and education, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, global tourism, and the globalization of many jobs, especially in IT (cited in Moore 2010, 1–2). The 2008 report identifies some new linguistic objects of anxiety unimagined in the earlier reports: national standards are perceived to be threatened by the use of English as a lingua franca and by what is seen as an overabundance of immigrant languages, some standardized, others not. As Duchêne (2008) has noted, this change in focus decisively separates the current European concern with multilingualism from earlier United Nations discourses on minority languages, and indeed from the problems of minorities in other parts of the world. The EU’s situation is certainly novel in this way.5

This shift in object is matched by dramatic transitions in the claims these reports make about language. The first follows United Nations documents recognizing “the right of every child to use his or her own mother tongue and the right of communities to develop their own language and culture” (Simone et al. 1986, 32). To this discourse of “rights” is added the rhetoric of languages as “cultural wealth,” or “heritage.” The second report makes a further distinction, noting its “profound shift in discursive position” (1996, ii):

Previous suggestions have conceived of minority language groups in emotive terms associated with the ‘traditional’ activities which are the emotional converse of rational “modernity,” concerned with the poetic, the literary or the musical, but never [before] with the economic . . . our argument involves the need to develop action [that promotes minority languages] not for the benefit of the various language groups as a European heritage, but for the economic advantage of the entire [European] Community. (Nelde et al. 1996, 60, my ellipsis)

The ideological axis of differentiation we have been discussing is clearly invoked here. Aligning themselves with what they call the neoliberal discourse of “human capital” that triumphed in the 1990s, Nelde et al. emphasize, “Given what is claimed concerning the importance of diversity as one of the advantages which Europe has over competing regions of the
world economy . . . [there is a need to] promote minority language groups as sources of diversity that derives from language and culture” (Nelde et al. 1996, 60).

These text segments locate minority languages on the traditional (“pride”) pole of an axis of differentiation, implicitly in contrast to standards at the universal/“profit” pole. Nelde and his colleagues then reapply this contrast within the category of the traditional, subdividing the “traditional” into two components, one that is more traditional, the other more “profit” oriented. Linguistic forms are then distributed over this new subdivision. Some aspects of minority languages (as in poetry, literature, music) belong at the traditional pole, but there are other aspects, heretofore unnoticed, that are more economic, more profit oriented. This seems a good example of the discursive shift that Heller and Duchêne (this volume) have described, showing convincingly that it has been evident worldwide in recent decades and precipitated by changes in late capitalism. In a complementary argument, I suggest the form and logic of the shift—as instanced at least in European materials—is the outcome of a somewhat separate semiotic process of differentiation.

The 2008 report seems to take quite a different tack, identifying different objects that seem to threaten a united Europe and that must therefore be managed, in this case through categorization. The 2008 report proposes what seems like an entirely new sociolinguistic regime: multilingualism. As we saw, multilingualism was earlier considered a problem of minorities; it would be solved by their assimilation or by “normativizing” the minority language and extending its use (Nelde et al. 1996, 44). By contrast, multilingualism in the 2008 report is proposed as a sign of Europeanness itself, at the core of the “European idea.” In fact, trilingualism is constituted as Europe-in-essence: the ideal is for each speaker to control a lingua franca, a mother tongue, plus a freely chosen language of affinity. According to the much repeated and amusing phrase, “Europeans should speak their mother tongue plus two other languages, one for business and one for pleasure.”

The goal of generalized multilingualism is novel. Yet, the values assigned to the languages of the ideal multilingual speaker in the slogan are very familiar. They sound a lot like “pride” and “profit.” A language of wide communication is placed on the “profit” end of the axis, and contrasted with the emotional weight and particularity of mother tongue. The third language, “for pleasure,” is elsewhere in the report called a “personal adoptive language” or a “second mother tongue.” Like the mother tongue, it too is supposed to be particular and personal:

By drawing a clear distinction, when the choice is made, between a language of international communication and a personal adoptive language, [we separate two decisions] one dictated by the needs of the broadest possible communication, and the other guided by a host of personal reasons . . . individual or family background, emotional
ties . . . cultural preferences. . . . open choice. (Final Report p. 11, cited in Moore 2010, 19)

As Moore (2010) observes in his analysis of this report, the ideological underpinnings remain the same as those of monolingual standardization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the values are differently distributed among linguistic forms. The axis of differentiation that earlier constituted monolingual standards, is now adopted by EU experts to envision and authorize a specific pattern of continent-wide multilingualism. The familiar contrast in values is not viewed within the parameter of the nation-state; it is not signaled by registers of a national standard. The sphere of comparison is Europe-wide: a world of standards in which each is an index of authenticity (as discussed earlier). Such an “upward recursion” of this axis of differentiation invites a category of instrumental, universal, apersonal placelessness to contrast with the authenticity and emplacedness signaled (at this level of contrast) by standard languages. A lingua franca points to such a category of value, purportedly only for instrumental business, a language of nowhere and no one in particular. Moore calls this ideological configuration a “standardization of diversity.” Hence, we get a sense of both familiarity and newness in the sociolinguistic regime envisioned by the 2008 report.

It is important to emphasize, as Moore (2010) does, that the three types of language and their uses, as outlined in the report, are not descriptions of practices or of functions. Like the intellectuals of earlier centuries, EU experts, under the veil of description, and perhaps unintentionally, are extending and reconstructing an ideological image. Like all ideologies of differentiation, this one produces recursions, as we have seen. It also produces erasures. Thus, English (the most common lingua franca) obviously has a plethora of important uses unmentioned in the report—from pick-up bars, to asking directions, to vacations. It indexes not only activities (e.g., business) but also aspects of the speaker’s identity (what kind of English? What kind of persons know English? Where have they been and where are they headed socially?). Mother tongues are similarly wide in their uses and the social relations they index. Some groups demand business be done in their mother tongue; commodities labeled in a “personal adoptive language” are likely to be more, not less, profitable. The ideological framework we have been analyzing is not a description of use but operates as a vision or model that highlights some and erases other aspects of sociolinguistic situations. Speakers do not simply replicate them, but rely on them to create novel and situated indexical meanings.

Multilingualism itself is an iconic sign. In the old dispensation it was an image of wavering; it provoked doubts about the speaker’s national loyalty. In the new framework it is iconic of flexibility and the “cosmopolitan,” comfortable in more than one place:
Speaking different languages means having both roots and wings, being at home in several cultures at once, being able to see oneself from the outside . . . reveling in linguistic polygamy. . . . Cosmopolitan Europeanization . . . means not just speaking a common language (English) but loving many European national languages. . . . monolingualism by contrast means blinkered vision. (Beck and Grande 2007, 100, my ellipses)

Just as the monolingual standard was ideologically understood as unifying opposed values in the context of the nation-state—elites via Locke as well as Herder—so noted sociologist Ulrich Beck tries to frame multilingualism as a sign that unifies the particular and the universal: he uses organic metaphors (roots and wings), familial, even passionately sexualized images, that are, however, rationally based in reflexivity and vision, to imagine a utopian relationship among people in a unified Europe.

Yet, if this multilingual sociolinguistic regime is also a form of standardization, then we may ask, what hierarchies are reproduced or created? If the semiotic process of differentiation contributes to making a new ideal type of speaker in Europe, then how does this actually happen, in specific historical cases? How are languages, linguistic varieties and even accents reframed in practice, so they take on different indexical values? I turn to these questions, with the help of ethnographic materials.

**ETHNOGRAPHIES OF LINGUISTIC “EUROPEANIZATION”**

My evidence so far has come from written texts about language in the rarified realms of pan-European elites. But the “pride”/“profit” axis is very broadly distributed. It has been inculcated as the standard in schooling and in labor markets. Evidence of such language ideologies among people who do not write reports comes from interviews and casual comments. More subtly, ethnographic observers have described speakers’ situated reactions to the linguistic forms they hear and use, inferring from such reactions the values speakers associate with the linguistic differences they recognize. In what follows, I rely on both kinds of evidence in three case studies that show how the valorization of multilingualism that is championed by the EU, under the pressure of late capitalist processes, is experienced, reiterated and resignified. Each of the cases—from Italy, Austria and Hungary—has its own historically specific dynamic, but each displays some aspect of the perspectival, differentiating process I have described.

The first example is a story of how linguistic signs come to index opposition to the EU and its perceived support of global markets. In her recent ethnography, Cavanaugh (2009) describes Bergamasco, the dialect/language of the northern Italian city of Bergamo. Although no longer ubiquitous, it is nevertheless still actively spoken, invariably paired with the Italian national
standard. In a familiar pattern, the use of Bergamasco indexed and evoked “sentimental ties to local place and cultural authenticity” (2009, 63). Use of Italian signaled the speaker’s education and engagement with the national Italian economy. Cavanaugh notes the range of variation in use: “Italian words with a Bergamasco accent, Bergamasco sentences with Italian words in them, Italian utterances structured around Bergamasco syntax . . . many utterances draw on both languages” (Cavanaugh 2009, 29).

By deploying this range of possibilities, self-described Bergamaschi—who distinguished themselves from mere Italians—made further distinctions among themselves, using the same contrast. That is, the category of Bergamaschi could be notionally subdivided—in a fractal move—into subcategories that were themselves distinguished from each other by the Bergamaschi/Italian contrast, if only momentarily. They could sound like the really authentic (but no longer existent) Bergamasco peasant voice; or like modern Italians. The range of linguistic variation signaled these contrasts in actual situations, where the relative Italianness of speakers with respect to each other is what shaped the interpretation. National politics had little to do with these contrasts. Individuals and situations were not permanently classified this way.

A further iteration (“upward”) becomes evident if we consider Bergamasco accents are heard from the perspective of Italy as a whole. The Northern League was active in Bergamo during Cavanaugh’s fieldwork. Such right wing associations have been made more effective in part by the political platform offered by the EU. Nevertheless, their anti-EU messages decry global trade, regulation from afar, immigration. Invariably, and predictably, this anti-“profit” message comes wrapped in local “pride” (see Holmes 2000). Most of the champions of Bergamasco in Bergamo did not sympathize with the Northern League. But if the parameter of comparison was a national television show, then a mere whiff of the Bergamo accent, which would hardly count as local in Bergamo, was enough to evoke for Italian listeners from other regions the conviction that the speaker took a right-wing political stance. Within a national frame, the modernity/tradition contrast took on a Europe-wide significance and thus political connotations, extending and partially erasing the older sense of tradition (voice of the peasant) linked to Bergamasco (Cavanaugh 2009, Chapter 6).

The Austrian case is an example of a different kind of resignification, also based on changed perspective and recursions. Many students from the valleys of Carinthia are bilingual speakers of Slovenian and the national standard, Austrian German. Their parents struggled hard to establish bilingual schools, and to gain legal recognition for Slovenian under the monolingual norms of the 1970s. Nevertheless, the children who attended these schools were reluctant to take up the rural, unsophisticated and backward voice that Slovenian continued to signal within Carinthia, further stigmatized by Carinthia’s anti-immigrant, antiminority politics.
When these students went to Vienna to attend university, they felt “freedom” and “openness.” In addition to the rich cultural offerings, they faced striking linguistic heterogeneity. Many languages were routinely heard on the street. More importantly, a novel parameter of comparison became available, especially after Slovenia was admitted to the EU and Slovenian was no longer only the language of migrants or minorities. Many of their kin who had stayed in Carinthia were still denying their knowledge of Slovene in attempts to assure upward mobility there. But the young people in Vienna could view themselves through a new ideology, one in which Slovenian—even the mountain dialect—no longer indexed backwoods tradition, but instead became the language (often their third after German and the obligatory school English) that made them trilingual and thus truly “cosmopolitan Europeans,” as in Beck’s utopian vision (Weichselbraun 2011).

My third example considers how the ideal of a trilingual Europe, while ostensibly inclusive and unifying, in practice has stratifying effects, reproducing long-standing east/west disparities. Unlike the erasure and stigmatization of immigrant languages, stateless languages and nonstandard forms, this phenomenon has not been extensively explored. I discuss the circumstances of elite speakers in Hungary in order to show the fine grain of stratification. The speakers I consider are in the highly educated, professional strata of Hungary, those who had hopes of “joining Europe” in 1989. Yet this position seems always just out of reach. When the Hungarian educated elite finally achieved competence in a second language—usually English—and attained the ability to reproduce this skill for their children, two languages were no longer sufficient to “join Europe” in an elite capacity.

A glimpse at the recent past shows why, for aspiring Hungarian elites, the ideal of trilingualism as icon of Europe appears to be a case of raising the bar. In Hungary, the overall population became more monolingual in the years of the Cold War than they had been in the nineteenth century and the interwar period. At the start of the twentieth century, as new states emerged from the multilingual Habsburg Empire, they aimed to modernize by reaching for the monolingual norm of the time. They destroyed the social institutions that had maintained multilingualism in previous centuries. In the decades after the Second World War, the western states increasingly taught foreign languages; in the state-socialist east, access to foreign travel, foreign mass media and education were restricted. In Hungary, foreign languages—except Russian—were viewed with suspicion. Multilingualism was not linked to political power or cultural influence. Economic advantage depended on party connections. Domestic journals and university hierarchies often rejected scholars who published in Western languages. For these, as well as other reasons, the “profit”/“pride” configuration of language ideology was not reproduced in Hungary and much of the east as it was in the west, until the final years of the cold war.

Given this history, it is small wonder that in a recent Eurostat Newsrelease (2009), when speakers aged twenty-five to sixty-four were asked
to judge their own language skills, only 29% of Germans said they were monolingual, 35% of Britons, 38% of Italians and 75% of Hungarians. These numbers, of course, both reflect the past and, by their very public presence, re-create the image of Western advantage.

Since the end of the cold war, the “profit”/“pride” distinction has been recuperated in Hungary with enthusiasm, along with capitalist social relations. Two examples of elite Hungarian women—educated before 1989—and their children can suggest how socioeconomic stratification since the cold war has been shaped by requirements of linguistic skill and the recursions of value they index on the “profit”/“pride” axis, in ways not experienced in earlier decades.

Anna is aged forty-five, with a doctorate in chemistry. She now works as regional coordinator for an American pharmaceutical company in Budapest, overseeing drug trials in Hungary and also in other parts of the world. She communicates electronically in English all day, staying in touch with company branches on five continents. She has a ten-year-old son and is planning a temporary transfer to the corporation’s main office in the United States, largely for the sake of the child. Consulting with me, she asked when would be the best time for her son to learn English quickly and painlessly. I said even at twelve to fourteen, children learn easily, if with a slight accent. Oh no, she said. She would not deprive the child of a good accent.

Julia is a fifty-year-old sociologist, working for a consulting firm in Budapest, and also for a research institute of the Academy of Sciences. In the firm, she writes applications on behalf of municipalities that seek government funds for development. Her work is entirely in Hungarian. She occasionally writes for English-language journals and sometimes goes to international conferences. On her advice, Julia’s twenty-something daughter studied French and English in college, but did not do well on the national language exams. As a last resort, the mother sent her daughter to academic acquaintances in Scotland for more exposure to English.

Because I have been in close contact with Anna and Julia for over twenty years, I know their knowledge of English was hard won. Having studied only Russian in school, they both struggled and paid considerable sums to learn English as adults, in the kind of language schools that now dot the inner cities of most eastern European capitals. Anna’s daily usage since then has made her into a fluent if not entirely confident speaker, especially in her firm’s corporate style. Yet, she knows she is not eligible for the truly high-paying and prestigious jobs that have opened up in the last two decades in her sphere of work. Despite her skills and experience she has hit a glass ceiling: she cannot aspire to the next rank of European manager in her firm. The most desirable positions go to those with the same professional training, but with a third language. Both women are determined to gain entrée to just such positions for their children.

Despite this similarity, the women are quite differently situated within the domestic economy. Anna was less well placed in the socialist hierarchy
in the 1990s, and was willing to take what seemed like a risky step at the
time: to work in the distinctly separate world of Western firms starting
to operate in eastern Europe. Julia, on the other hand, followed her par-
ents’ socialist-era path into academic life. Like academics under social-
ism, she is employed by the state, and holds two jobs to make ends meet.
By contrast, Hungarian salaries in firms such as Anna’s, though not as
high as in the western branches, are calculated (if not paid) in Euros. In
this bifurcated economy, Anna—but not Julia—is part of a stratum that,
largely through differential linguistic skills, can consume and travel in
ways unimaginable for others in the same country whose responsibilities
are otherwise quite similar.

Anna and Julia often characterized their bilingual repertoires in
“profit”/“pride” terms. As mother tongue, the special flavor and literary
beauty of Hungarian have never been in doubt. There is also a centuries-old
adage that Hungarian is not a “world language” (világnyelv); “one can-
not go far with it.” English is the language believed to serve the “broadest
possible communication,” confirming the common-sense view that it is an
instrumental “necessity” for getting a good job. In juxtaposition, the two
languages also carry the other contrasts on this axis of differentiation.

Yet Julia and Anna never judged English in exclusively instrumental
terms. Rather, the value category that English represents was minutely sub-
divided: degrees of speakers’ modernity, rationality and professional expert-
tise that English indexes in interaction depended on the supposed “quality”
of the English spoken. This is reminiscent of “misrecognitions” in monolin-
gual standardization and has been described for other postsocialist contexts
(Prendergast 2008). Julia and Anna recursively applied the “pride”/“profit”
contrast within the category of the “profit” language. They made very fine
distinctions among their acquaintances, judging “accent” especially. This
is reflected in their considerable efforts to assure for their children what the
mothers imagine to be native English competence. Anna, however fluent,
felt humiliated in interactions with her international contacts, painfully
attending to the differences between her own English and that of those
non-native speakers who had had English instruction in childhood. Each
such interaction re-created a hierarchy between speakers with different
skills, one that, like the differences between monolingualism, bilingualism
and trilingualism—but at a narrower category—all too often reproduced
on newly linguistic terms a long-standing hierarchy of west over east.

CONCLUSION

This chapter started with an empirical puzzle about the apparent familiarity
of language ideologies promulgated by the EU, despite the great changes in
political economy to which the EU is a response and in which it is an active
participant. In order to solve that conundrum, this chapter took a detour
into the history of “pride”/“profit,” as an axis of differentiation that creates contrasting values and posits linguistic forms that index them. The EU’s language ideology turned out to consist of reiterations, at a broader compass, of the same value contrasts that had guided the creation of standard languages in nineteenth- and twentieth-century nation-states. A single axis of differentiation underpins both, but the contrasting values are attached to different linguistic practices.

The same mode of analysis proved revealing in understanding ethnographic materials from three European sites. The “pride/profit” axis and its correlates—for example, modernity/tradition, reason/passion—are not limited to the documents and institutions of governments and suprastate organizations. They are part of an old and widespread ideology of differentiation in Europe that has been harnessed to capitalist processes for centuries. It continues to be used politically to proliferate categories of value and forms of personhood linked to linguistic practice; they create or reproduce what are understood by speakers to be self-evident hierarchies, as in standardization.

These empirical conclusions lead to a conceptual one. The current phase of capital has important, specific effects. Indeed, the ever-changing and expanding logic of capitalism and its encounters with political forms like nation-states transform all aspects of the social world, including linguistic practices. But these effects are not direct. They are always mediated by language ideologies that formulate and interpret political economic changes in ways that make them relevant to language, or mobilize arguments about language that justify political and economic action. As this volume argues, language ideologies have a logic of their own that requires analytical attention. This chapter further suggests that one kind of language ideology constructs difference and consists of a semiotic process—indexical, iconic and fractal, with erasures—that creates, frames and reiterates cultural contrasts of value. The dramatic and historically specific changes wrought by late capitalism in production, consumption, and management incite and exploit such differentiations and result in their partial transmutations.

NOTES

1. This is not the only axis of differentiation of importance in Europe; other contrasts have been similarly significant and often cross cut the conceptual distinctions discussed here. For instance, the famous perceived opposition between individual and society would certainly complicate the processes discussed here. Other patterns of contrasts not only cross cut but have been in outright conflict with the one examined here in the course of the last two centuries. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, for instance, there were struggles against the instrumental/authentic distinction among elites and the general population in the middle of the nineteenth century (Gal 2011).

2. The quotation marks around “diversity” signal that EU discourses usually use this term to refer to linguistic difference that is officially recognized and
positively valued, such as national standards; other terms are used when the proliferation of linguistic forms is seen as threatening to European unity. Moreover, even when diversity is recognized, nonstandard forms are rarely taken into consideration (see Gal 2006).

3. It is worth remarking that, like Bauman and Briggs, all of the writers I have discussed were not only noticing but also (re)constructing the contrasts and iterations they describe, just as I too am engaging in the same kind of intertextual project.

4. My thanks to Robert Moore for suggesting this felicitous phrase.

5. My thanks to Alexandre Duchêne for clarifying discussion of this issue.

6. As many observers have noted, not all multilingualisms are alike. What Beck and others have in mind carries great prestige; a minority language paired with an eastern European state language or with a stateless or nonstandardized language is not. This is another form of hierarchization that I have discussed elsewhere (Gal 2006).

REFERENCES


