Why Fight?:
Examining Self-Interested Versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion

NICHOLE ARGO

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror, or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social-network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation toward process rather than outcome. This article tests these two lines of argument against each other by directly linking values orientations in a refugee camp to professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion in two different contexts. Professed willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Results are discussed.

Nichole Argo is currently pursuing a doctorate in Psychology at the New School for Social Research. After obtaining an MA. in International Policy Studies at Stanford, she lived and worked for several years as a journalist and field researcher in Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and England. She also holds an MS in Political Science from MIT.

I would like to thank Amal, Hassan, Nakaa, and Hala—in the West Bank—for their help interpreting and implementing the survey; Scott Atran, Khalil Shikaki, Shalom Schwartz, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Chappell Lawson for feedback on the survey instrument; Bob Pape, Roger Petersen, Ken Oye, Chaim Kaufman, Byron Bland, Betsy Paluck, Janet Lewis,
INTRODUCTION

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror, or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. For instance, Dr. David Buklay notes that being a good Muslim is the way to get to heaven: “Attention to [Islamic jihadis’] own justifications suggest that, for them, Islam and its call for jihad is the primary motivation.”1 Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social-network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation toward process rather than outcome.

In this paper, I argue that survey data linking individual value orientations to professed willingness to participate in resistance and rebellion can contribute to the literature by offering direct evidence about insurgent motivations (or the motivations behind popular support for insurgency) in real time. As a pilot of this approach, I then describe data collected on value orientations and professed willingness to participate in violence from the Balata Refugee Camp, near Nablus in the Palestinian Territories.

The second section, “Literature,” juxtaposes the literature on collective action with the empirics on political violence. Two strains of theorizing emerge. One views motivations for rebellion as self-enhancing; the other views participation in a costly rebellion as communally oriented. This section probes the ways in which communally motivated individuals appear to calculate differently than self-interested ones.

The third section, “Values Survey, Balata Refugee Camp,” describes the conceptual background, content, and composite construction of the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire.

The fourth section, “Results and Discussion,” demonstrates that evidence for both instrumental incentives and communal orientation exists in Palestine, then describes the survey instrument and method as it was employed in Balata Refugee Camp. The survey assessed the value priorities of each respondent (self-enhancing versus community-enhancing), then asked them to consider four resistance activities that varied on a scale of anticipated sacrifice. Respondents rated how much they would feel like participating in

---

the resistance activities in two different contexts: (a) during a time of peace, and (b) after a noncombatant from their neighborhood had been killed.

The concluding section, “Why Motivations Matter,” walks the reader through the survey results. The data suggest that Palestinians who score high on self-enhancing values feel less likely to participate in collective action, in general, and costly resistance, in particular. This is a marked contrast to those with high communal orientation scores. This section discusses policy implications and suggests several directions for future research.

LITERATURE

Rebellion and the Collective Action Problem

Rebellion is a collective action problem. As with other forms of social mobilization, it makes little sense for individuals to join an insurgency: they will incur potentially great costs (time, risks, money, and effort), and even if they are successful in increasing the collective good, it will only have marginal payoff for themselves. Theoretically, therefore, the rational individual is expected to “free ride” (or, in the case of rebellion, let others fight on the individual’s behalf).

Yet people often do not free ride. That is, individuals participate in collective actions such as insurgency despite costs to themselves. In his seminal work on the subject, Mancur Olson sought to explain non-free-riding behavior. He proposed that selective incentives make individual investments in collective action rational by changing the payoff structure for individuals who participate. According to his theory, such selective incentives could include coercion (the threat of punishment for not participating), monetary incentives, insurance plans, and price discounts. When one of these selected incentives accompanies the option of participating in a collective action, individuals weigh the costs and benefits of participating and act on the option according to the highest self-benefit. In the literature review below, I explore the relevance of these incentives to insurgent recruitment under the heading of “self-enhancement” motivations.

Olson’s work has been transformative, but importantly, his theories do not explain a wide array of mobilization. His mistake may have been in assuming the isolation of actors: in reality, an individual’s well-being cannot be disentangled from that of his or her community. Our individual identities,  

---


3 In a footnote, Olson adds “erotic incentives, psychological incentives, moral incentives, and so on.” However, for decades this footnote was virtually ignored, and at the time, he still seemed to conceive of emotional incentives as personal or self-oriented needs. Ibid., 61.

4 Benefit is a relative term that can include escape from anticipated risks and costs. Thus, “benefit” refers to relative benefit, meaning the most optimal anticipated outcome of two or more scenarios.

emotions, and values include elements of our social identities, and in some cases can even be subsumed by them.\(^6\)

Social-psychological studies suggest that individuals sacrifice for the group in collective actions because of socio-emotional motivations rather than selective incentives. Political scientist Michael Taylor offered a theoretical framework to understand the socio-emotional process. Once first-actors take daring or heroic action in the name of resistance, their acts draw others into high-risk resistance via norms of reciprocity: X resists because Y resisted, and now X feels obligated.\(^7\) For these individuals, risks, costs, and personal benefits are not the primary calculus. Instead, they are driven by feelings of social obligation and/or a feeling of moral self-satisfaction from doing the right thing.\(^8\) In the literature review below, I address these motivations with the term “communal orientation.”

Individuals with self-interested versus communal values appear to conceive and calculate decisions differently. Conceptually, it may be helpful to think of these value priorities in terms of instrumental rationality and value rationality. Sociologist Max Weber was the first to differentiate between these terms. He characterized the former as consequentialist—that is, concerned more with ends than means (economic man). The latter are termed deontological, or concerned more with means than ends (social or reciprocating man). Value-rational motivation is thus concerned with “doing the right thing” rather than producing the right outcome. In the actor’s opinion, it involves “commands” or “demands” which are binding to the

---

\(^6\) This tension between individual and social identity is not at all new to comparative politics; its implications for rationality have been considered across subdisciplines, often in domains far more settled than conflict zones. For example, in James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), they dropped the assumption of rationality, instead arguing that people tend to operate out of a “logic of appropriateness.” Similarly, sociological institutionalists Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio see individuals as so imbedded within their cultural and historical frameworks that they cannot attempt to make the theoretical separation between universal tendencies for instrumental rationality and culturally informed notions of preferences and preferred strategies. See Powell and DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Mark Ross argues that culture not only provides meaning and interpretation to actors, but also the basis of social and political identity that affects how people group themselves. See Mark Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*, eds., Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42–80. Lastly, social movement scholar Doug McAdam argues that the problem with many rational choice theorists is that they place the individual before the group, when the group in fact comes before the individual. See Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


\(^8\) Marwell and Oliver distinguish between social obligations and acceptance, and the feeling of moral self-satisfaction that comes from doing the right thing. They label the first *solidary incentives*, and the latter *moral/purposive incentives*. Marwell and Oliver, *The Critical Mass in Collective Action*, 7.
actor. These commands or demands derive from a conscious ethical, religious, or social belief and are thus somehow bound to the community. In sum, value rationality is means-oriented, fundamentally connected to—and defined by—one’s social world and perhaps, most importantly, is meant to be pursued independently of its prospects of success.

Increasingly, empirical evidence supports the idea that people in a consequentialist mode calculate differently than in a deontologist mode. Neuroimaging studies shed some light on how instrumentally rational and value-rational processes may differ within the brain. In laboratory work on moral decision making, for instance, most subjects prefer to let a trolley hit five people rather than push one person onto the tracks, despite the decision not to push costing four lives. These respondents are reacting almost viscerally to the social value of “do not kill,” and this response trumps the instrumental calculation. When these subjects are scanned within an fMRI while they responded to moral dilemmas, their value rational judgments (do not push one person to death, but let four die) are characterized by activation in the socio-emotional areas of the prefrontal cortex, whereas utilitarian judgments (push one person to death, save four lives) show stronger activation in areas of executive functioning or pure cognition.

While I am not arguing that there is a direct overlap between communal motivation and value rationality, it is worth noting that some of the socially influenced, risk-insensitive decisions taken by people with communal orientations appear similar. If this is the case, then traditional Olsonian paradigms would not pertain to individuals with strong communal orientation. Individuals with strong self-enhancement priorities may think in terms of risks, costs, and benefits, but those with communal orientations would calculate in terms of justice, dignity, and an orientation toward process.

Below, I examine the literature on participation in violent resistance according to the self-enhancement and communal paradigms above. In the first category, individuals are treated as instrumentally rational actors who only contribute to costly political violence if they receive individual benefits (or escape harm) because of that participation. In the communal perspective, the distinction between the individual and the group is lost. Individuals identify so strongly with their group that they internalize group goals as their

---


11 Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement.” There is actually no such thing as “pure” cognition. Affect appears to play a role at various levels of brain processing. The term is used here for simplicity’s sake.
own and are motivated to participate in collective action by social norms, obligation, or moral emotion. These individuals are free of the collective action problem as they are focused more on the appropriateness of means rather than the costs or benefits of outcome.

Rebellion: Arguments for the Self-Interested Warrior

To the extent that political science research on insurgency, terrorism, and civil war has examined insurgent recruitment, it has treated it as a collective action problem. For the most part, the media has also appropriated the cost-benefit assumptions of instrumental rationality and selective incentives, though they do not use the same language.

Consider the stories of coerced recruitment that exist within almost every insurgency. It has been said that insurgent recruits in Iraq have been lured into militant organizations and then threatened (harm to self or loved ones) if they attempt to defect. At one point, U.S. military officials attested that many Iraqi car bombers had been tied to their cars or blackmailed, implying that they did not willingly take on the mission. In coercive contexts such as these, the selective incentive being offered to a recruit is escape from punishment. But this calculus can be obtained even without an insurgent organization. For instance, Stathis Kalyvas has recently argued that it becomes rational to participate in resistance when indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics are employed against the population—taking up arms is the only recourse one has to protect self and family.

Another popular hypothesis is that religious extremism drives insurgents to great sacrifice in the name of God. Jeremy Weinstein contends that religious or ideological fervor can produce seemingly irrational devotion to rebellion via a rational calculus: if one’s religious beliefs about the afterlife are construed as goals, then all risks and sacrifices in the here and now are rational means to that end. Sunni extremists, for example, are said to be

---

12 This review focuses solely on motivation from the perspective of an individual embedded in social and structural context and incorporates organizational or societal factors when directly relevant. That said, some important works that model motivation at multiple levels of analysis are omitted here. These include, but are not limited to, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, “Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 364–81; Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 2 (2003): 65–92; and Mohammed Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 2 (2006): 165–86.


indoctrinated in madrassas, where they come to believe that salvation and virgins will await them if they sacrifice in the jihadi cause.\(^{15}\)

Stories of status-seeking, deprivation (frustration-aggression), and revenge can also be depicted as self-interested motivations. The status-seeker’s ego is boosted by knowing the death of a martyr is superior to that of most in society. The deprived strikes out in rage against personal injustices and indignities.\(^{16}\) Lastly, the avenger settles a score for personal loss.\(^{17}\) In each of these scenarios, an emotional action-tendency is conceptualized as a goal; the act fulfills an emotional urge of a particular person. The act is not committed because the individual believes a “command” or “demand” has been placed on that individual by society.

But while these theories of self-oriented motivations are plausible, they do not bear out in the terrorism data. For instance, measures of deprivation such as low education and poverty do not predict terrorism or insurgency, and neither does personal exposure to repression.\(^{18}\) In addition, organizational coercion and indoctrination do not appear to play a strong role. Almost 95 percent of Marc Sageman and Scott Atran’s thousand plus Sunni extremist network were enlisted in the jihad through friends or family.\(^{19}\) A similar trend of volunteering rather than recruitment or indoctrination existed in a 2003–2004 study of fifteen would-be Palestinian suicide bombers.\(^{20}\)

In sum, the literature establishes that Olsonian incentives can and do exist within various rebellions and insurgencies today—as coercion, monetary reward, ideological belief, etc. But evidence that militants are responding to such incentives is only indirect. For example: “If recruits are poor and if monetary incentives exist, then individuals join for money.” This is a “just so” account: the existence of poverty and/or payments do not prove that the individuals in question are actually motivated by them, it assumes it. To prove motivation one way or the other, we need to link individuals’ motivating values to their behavior.


\(^{17}\) Revenge is often cited as a motivation for terror recruits, as discussed in the cases of Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and Palestine in Mia Bloom, \textit{Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).


Rebellion: The Warrior of and for the People

Communal motivations may include the emotional satisfaction that comes from acting with or for others as well as moral feelings of self-satisfaction derived from doing the right thing. Above, I noted that communal motivations appear to be more socio-emotional than cognitive, more concerned with means than ends, and sometimes, cost-insensitive.

Is there evidence to support this proposition? Social-psychological survey evidence demonstrates that costly cooperation is linked to high in-group identification, and that identification with a collective is a reliable predictor of protest participation. This is useful, but the surveys were done in peacetime locations. Would the increased costs of collective action during wartime yield different results? Perhaps. Elizabeth Wood’s field interviews with insurgents seem to support these findings. She identified solidary motivations among insurgent campesinos in El Salvador, describing “a deeply felt sense of pleasure experienced together by participants, [in their] public assertion of dignity, self-worth, and insurgent collective identity.” She continues, “[The] value [they attributed to participation] was not contingent on success....”

Ashutosh Varshney suggests that dignity and expressions of self-respect are among the most foundational elements of nationalism and help to explain nationalists’ willingness to accept high costs.

Most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations...Dignity and self-respect form the microfoundations of...nationalism or ethnic behavior. Driven by such values, resisting nationalists are willing to endure very high costs—and for long periods of time.

Indeed, Jeremy Weinstein notes that leaders of insurgencies that are rooted in shared identities or beliefs, with networks that connect them to the civilian population, do not have to use payoffs to attract recruits.

So far we have survey evidence that in-group identification predicts costly collective action and descriptions of insurgent interviews that seem to support it. But it is social-network analyses have best been able to link these...
two types of evidence together, showing how communal motivation drives enlistment in insurgency. For instance, Petersen showed that the Lithuanian communities that rebelled against Soviet occupiers in the 1940s had social structures that fostered close group ties, and thus, norms of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{27} Similar enlistment patterns were found in communist and fascist organizations decades ago.\textsuperscript{28} Perhaps it should come as no surprise, therefore, that one predictor of terror participation is affiliation to a sports team or informal communal association—these are the types of friendship and kinship relations that constitute strong community and norms of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{29}

It appears that communal orientation may be necessary to inspire collective action at increasing levels of sacrifice. But is it sufficient? Individuals who care about the conflict because of their identification with the collective may still respond to selective incentives, although they would likely not tell a researcher. Moreover, given the difficulty of intensive field research within conflict zones, it may be hard to collect the kind of detailed interview and social-network data necessary for extensive cross-case analysis of insurgents, terrorists, or the civilian motivations. In areas where a full social-network analysis cannot be attained, therefore, a value survey would be useful triangulating data in addition to interviews. In short, a survey able to link value orientations to behavior—either participation, professed willingness to participate, or civilian support for violence—would help to triangulate evidence.

Surveys and Motives

Given the debate on motivations for participation in rebellion, it may seem surprising that very few surveys dealing with protest, other forms of resistance or rebellion have thoroughly measured both self-enhancement and communal motivations. Several do attempt to capture these motivations and are well designed.\textsuperscript{30} But they face one important limitation. Arguably the greatest contribution of the past fifty years of psychology is that humans do not act for the reasons that we think we do, that is respondents themselves may not know what initially drove them to join. Answers to a multiple-choice offering might get at ex-combatant narratives about why and what one did in a rebel group, but it is not a direct test of real-time motivations.

\textsuperscript{27} Petersen, \textit{Resistance and Rebellion}.

\textsuperscript{28} Donatella Della Porta, \textit{Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).


A psychometric values survey provides researchers an opportunity to collect data on motivations in real time and to do so in a way that the respondent can less easily control. It is also far easier than the intensive fieldwork required for process-oriented conflict/terror research today. Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran appropriated the Schwartz value survey for this purpose, analyzing the extent to which communal versus self-enhancement value priorities predicted whether Israeli settlers would protest or take up violence against Palestinians (this was during the settler expulsions of the late 1990s). They found that the willingness of settlers to participate in legal protests and illegal violence (against both Israelis and Palestinians) was predicted by communal motivations rather than self-interested ones.

Are the Ginges and Atran findings generalizable beyond the Israeli settler experience? One reason they may not be is that the settlers were in the early stages of response to Israeli government policies at that time and had not fully developed a recruitment mechanism. It is therefore unclear that instrumental incentives—such as organized payment, status, or even threats—existed in the movement at that time. A good next test would be to run a similar design in a resistance movement that is more developed and where selective incentives are known to exist.

The Palestinian Case

The second Palestinian intifada is home to both instrumental and communal incentives. Moreover, given that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for decades, most Palestinians have engaged in some form of resistance—violent or nonviolent—against Israel and are therefore aware of these incentives.

Resistance can comprise activities with few (if any) sacrifices, such as visiting injured people in the hospital, throwing stones, disobeying a soldier, or rallying in the streets during a curfew. However, since the outbreak of the second intifada, resistance tactics have become increasingly violent. Today, Palestinian resistance is often costly, including high-sacrifice measures such as defense of the community during Israeli incursions, offensive gun attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or Israeli settlers, and even total sacrifice as an istish‘bađi, or human bomb. Thus, resistance in Palestine exists along an established spectrum of anticipated sacrifice, and the public is familiar with all activities along the spectrum.

It is also easy to identify the presence of selective incentives in Palestine. For instance, there are material incentives for joining militant organizations. As in the U.S. Army, payments are given to insurgents or their families—for their service, for injury, and even for death. Some claim that Hamas uses its social-welfare apparatus to reward those who participate in the movement, and likewise deny social benefits to those who do not. Saddam Hussein is known to have sent up to twenty-five thousand dollars to the families of suicide bombers through organizations such as Hamas and Fatah, and the Arab Bank has recently been charged for assisting families of bombers. Many in the West also believe that religious zealousness—the reward of virgins in heaven, and the desire to meet Allah—drive Palestinian resistance. Others conclude that young men enlist in militant organizations to earn esteem and status, since the conditions of life in the territories are so harsh that traditional means of self-esteem are unavailable (for example jobs, money, and, therefore, marriage).

A real test requires that both selective incentives and value rationality exist in one setting. Is there evidence to suggest that value rationality is at play in Palestinian resistance motivations? Interviews with bombers and militants reveal moral outrage in response to Israeli actions more than—or instead of—instrumental incentives. Asked to explain what led him to choose to enlist in a mission, for instance, one militant responded, “There were a few factors ... the stress created by the occupation, the humiliation by the search of a female relative, the killing and crimes executed against kids....” Civilian death, and specifically the death of children, became a recurring theme: “Pictures of dead kids had a major affect on me. Many were killed before me, like my friend whom I had to carry in my own arms,” and “The killing of the kids is the thing that affected my decision a lot.”

Interviews have also suggested the importance of feeling empowered through the act of resistance. Speaking from prison in 2003, one preempted bomber told me, “The most important thing was that we [the Palestinian people] should make the operation in the heart of Israel after the penetration in order to prove that we were not influenced by the military attack.” This will to retaliate was, in militant minds, a social good. Asked how the Palestinian public perceived the missions, another reported, “The people

---

34 Interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the full names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Interviews by Nichole Argo, 2003–2005. Moad, age 21, interview by Nichole Argo, 2004. Moad’s mission was on behalf of Islamic Jihad, but he did not join the organization—he was a member of Fatah.
35 Ibid.
36 Khalil, age 37, interview by Nichole Argo, 2004.
37 Hassan, age 18, interview by Nichole Argo, 2004.
were happy after each mission, because they proved [sic] the Jews that they are strong, that they can react.”38 Polls of the general public bear this out: Throughout the second intifada, Palestinians viewed retaliatory violence as just and appropriate, even if they generally disagreed with the tactic in which it was pursued.39

In accordance with experimental studies, the value-rational mindset characteristic of the interviewees appeared insensitive to costs and outcomes, and focused on justice—in this case, punishment. Khalil, a thirty-seven-year-old Gazan who drove a bomber to a mission on Passover in 2003, stated “I am not a political man and I didn’t think of the benefits [strategically, of the mission]. Like they kill us, I wanted them to hurt as much as we do.”40 Another interviewee, a preempted bomber, focused on the emotional rewards that came from the assertion of control and power:

That we are able to react against their bombing and their killing of inhabitants of the camp is important. My mission made them [the camp] happy, also women and children. *Even if* the inhabitants were punished a lot in Jenin. The land and trees and houses were punished; nothing remains that they did not punish.

Recent survey work by Atran, Ginges, and Khalil Shikaki illuminated a norm among the Palestinian public—it explicitly rewarded communal but not self-interested motivations for rebellion too. Survey respondents were angered by vignettes of individuals who joined the struggle for monetary benefit.41 That is, even if the act of rebellion leads to the same outcome for the individual who does it for money and the individual who does it for God and community, the Palestinian public condemns the act made by the one who does it for money.

Both self-enhancing and communal motivations exist today in Palestine. The question is which ones are most likely to motivate persons who would participate in resistance and rebellion?

VALUES SURVEY, BALATA REFUGEE CAMP

For scholars interested in the relationships between motivations and/or identity and political outcomes, the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is one

38 Moad, age 21, interview by Nichole Argo, about Israeli actions in Jenin.
40 Khalil, age 37, interview by Nichole Argo.
Why Fight?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Defining goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Independent thought and action. Need for control and mastery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Excitement, novelty, challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Personal success through demonstrating competence to social standards. Focus on social esteem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. Focus on social esteem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Restraint of actions and inclinations, likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one’s culture provides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the in-group).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (the out-group).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 1 Description of Schwartz Values

Potential solution. The conception of values used in the PVQ incorporates numerous representations of the term. PVQ items represent values in the following ways: beliefs (inextricably linked to affect), goals that motivate action, orientations that transcend specific situations (such as norms and attitudes), and standards or criteria for evaluating actions. Schwartz identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. Figure 1 offers a short description of each value.

This paper has been focused on self-enhancement versus communal orientation values. How do we create them from the ten values listed above, and how do we know they will be valid composites?

The answer lies in the preexisting structure of dynamic relations among the ten values listed above. The ten values have been shown to constitute a circular structure that portrays a universal pattern of conflict and congruence among the values (see Figure 3 below), and the circular relation of the values represents a motivational continuum. For instance, pursuing achievement values typically conflicts with pursuing benevolence values, and thus achievement and benevolence oppose each other on the wheel. In contrast, achievement and power values tend to go together and are congruent to each other on the wheel. Tradition and security are next to one another on the wheel because they both seek to preserve the existing social arrangements that give certainty to life.

---

Self-enhancement and communal orientation are naturally existing composites. Self-enhancement includes the values of achievement and power; communal orientation includes security, conformity, and tradition.

The PVQ offers short verbal portraits of forty different people, gender-matched to the respondent. Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point to the importance of a value. For each portrait, respondents answer the question, “How much like you is this person?” Response choices are as follows: very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, and not like me at all. While some individuals (or cultures) might be inclined to use the middle of the response scale more than the extremes, this does not affect overall scores because responses are scaled to measure the relative importance of the different values—not the absolute importance of any one value.

**FIGURE 2** Model of Relations Among Ten Motivational Types of Values.

**FIGURE 3** Resistance Activities According to Expected Sacrifice.
Tests in seventy diverse cultures confirm that the value structure is universal, although individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to the respective values. That is, both individuals and groups have different value “priorities” or “hierarchies,” and these differences allow investigators to test competing hypotheses regarding the motivational origins of behavioral choices.

Schwartz value priorities have been used as instruments to predict voting intentions, voting behavior, readiness for out-group contact, and trust in social situations.

Value Orientation

This survey aimed to investigate how self-interested versus communal value priorities influenced Palestinians’ willingness to participate in resistance. It did so by using the PVQ to collect data on two sets of values: self-enhancement (achievement, power) and communal orientation (security, conformity, and tradition). Internal reliabilities for both composites were high. Chronbach’s alpha for the communal orientation composite is .78; for self-enhancement, alpha is .73.

The communal orientation scale captures values of “security” (family security, national security), “tradition” (accepting life, religion), and “conformity” (obedience) values. Relatively high scores on this scale signify a commitment to the values of one’s group. Thus, if the “selfless” or value rationality perspective is correct and resistance is motivated by a commitment to the group, communal orientation will be positively related to the dependent variable.

---

47 Individuals and groups differ in their use of the response scale, so scores needed to be corrected. Calculations were therefore made as follows: (a) Scores for each value were computed by taking the mean of the questionnaire items that indexed it—in the case of self-enhancement and communal orientation, the individual values that constitute the composites were added and averaged. (Internal reliabilities were then checked for these scores); (b) Each individual’s mean score across all questionnaire items was computed. This became MRAT; and (c) Scores of each of the values for an individual (computed in A) were then centered around that individual’s MRAT (that is, subtract MRAT from each of the value scores).
48 These are questions 4, 10, 16, 24, and 26 on Appendix B.
49 These are questions 7, 15, 20, and 28 on Appendix B.
50 These are questions 5, 11, 22, and 27 on Appendix B.
Values prioritizing self-enhancement motives are captured by the self-enhancement scale in Schwartz’s survey: they are represented by questions dealing with individual power (social power, authority, and wealth)\textsuperscript{51} and achievement (personal success, ambition).\textsuperscript{52} If selective incentives exist and cost-benefit rationales are motivating resistance participation, then self-enhancement scores should be negatively correlated with anticipated resistance. Chronbach’s alpha for self-enhancement was .73.

Willingness to Participate

Resistence and Rebellion. Social psychologist Brian Barber identified over eighty means of resistance during his fieldwork in Gaza during the first intifada.\textsuperscript{53} But the nature of Palestinian resistance changed with the outbreak of the second intifada. With the help of four Palestinian research assistants, I augmented the list to include gun attacks and suicide bombings. The research assistants independently rated the resistance activities according to sacrifice level, and mean scores were used to select representative actions for this paper.

As shown in Figure 3, the resistance activities used as dependent variables in this analysis are (1) visiting a person injured by Israel in the second intifada, (2) participating in a rally during a curfew, (3) taking up arms to defend the neighborhood when Israel enters at night, and (4) becoming a human bomb (\textit{istish'hadi}).

A brief description of each activity will help to explain its placement on the continuum. At the left end of the spectrum, where the only cost is that of time, is “visiting a person injured by the IDF.” Virtually every Palestinian has known someone injured during the conflict, so this act is familiar to all.

Second from the left is “rally during curfew.” If there is a curfew, it means that the IDF are within town and have asked all civilians to stay inside their homes during specific time periods. Attending a rally during curfew entails potential sacrifices (for example the IDF may arrest or shoot into the crowd) and is thus a risk. But given the size of the crowd and a history of few deaths/injuries per curfew rally, this activity is perceived to be low expected sacrifice.

The next activity, “defend the neighborhood when the IDF comes in,” entails very high risk. The IDF enters Palestinian neighborhoods to search for wanted individuals and almost always comes during the night. Some neighborhoods have a nonpartisan “defense force” comprising young and middle-aged adult men. There is a local cache of weapons, and men from the households converge at a predesignated location, where they fall into

\textsuperscript{51} These are questions 1, 12, and 29 on Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{52} These are questions 3, 9, 17, and 19 on Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{53} Barber, “Political Violence, Social Integration and Youth Functioning.”
a hierarchy of command. During the chaotic moments of Israeli entry, this makeshift defense force gives and returns fire. Palestinian casualties are commonplace; deaths are frequent.

Furthest to the right is the act of becoming an *istish'habi*, or human bomb. This act assures one’s death and thereby entails the premeditated decision to sacrifice one’s life for the cause.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they would be willing to participate in each activity: (a) during a time of peace where both sides were living up to the agreement, and (b) the morning after Israeli troops had invaded their neighborhood and killed a three-year-old girl. These questions were meant to induce situationally based emotions and capture some of the promise of using anchored vignettes. Answers were coded on a 0–1 scale where “0” represented “no” and “1” represented “yes” (see Appendix for actual survey questions).

Sample Population: Balata Refugee Camp

The survey sample consisted of 351 Muslim Palestinians living in Balata Refugee Camp (population 21,903) near Nablus in the West Bank. Respondents ranged from age fifteen to sixty-five, with a mean of thirty-one years. On average, they reported personally knowing three Palestinians who had been killed in the conflict with Israel. The survey did not ask about political affiliations, however, Balata is known to have active followings in Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

Balata’s twenty-two thousand inhabitants live within two square kilometers, making it one of the most densely populated places on Earth. It is also amongst the poorest areas in the West Bank and is known by Palestinians as a center of rebellion against Israel (to Israelis, it is one center of terrorist activities in the West Bank).

This survey took place in early February 2007. At the time of the survey, there was a ceasefire between Palestinian factions and Israel, and weekly efforts to bring all parties to the table for peace talks. Israel had opened 10 percent of the checkpoints in the West Bank, many of which had previously blocked travel between Palestinian Cities. Travel was therefore much easier. However, while residents of Nablus experienced a general Israeli presence less than before, the IDF still entered Balata Refugee Camp approximately two to three times per week to carry out arrests or targeted

---

54 In the instructions, we emphasized that the response did not indicate that they would act in such a way, only that the situation would make them feel like doing so.
56 They were coded as “personally knowing” victims if the victim was a friend, family member, or neighbor.
57 Coding was completed in Palestine on 15 April 2007.
killings. The two situational measures of our dependent variable—peacetime versus the morning after a noncombatant was killed in one’s neighborhood—were therefore salient.

Sampling Procedure

Palestinians are sensitive to the possibility of infiltration by the Shin Bet, the CIA, or collaborators and are therefore wary of outsiders. On the other hand, they are not new to outsider interventions: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has extensive operations within Palestinian refugee camps and has been even more active since the Hamas elections, after which foreign aid was halted and the economy fell. With this in mind, we did not expect resistance to the idea of a survey, but we did expect suspicion regarding its intentions. In response, we framed the survey as an attempt to “understand daily Palestinian life in the 2nd intifada.”

Four hundred Arabic surveys were delivered by hand to every fiftieth household in Balata. Deliveries were made by a team of four research assistants (RAs), two men and two women, who were trained in sample selection, personability during household interaction, and the content of the survey. The RAs explained the survey objectives and assured each respondent that survey answers would remain anonymous. To emphasize this, the surveyors carried a large cardboard box and illustrated how the respondent’s survey would, upon pickup, be randomly inserted by the respondent into the pile and then shuffled. If a member of the household agreed to the survey, they were informed that the surveyors would return in two to three hours to pick it up. 351 out of 400 surveys were submitted, a return rate of 88 percent.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Figure 4 represents the percentage of the population willing to engage in each act under conditions of peace or war, respectively.

As would be expected, more people reported willingness to help the injured and rally under curfew than violently defend the neighborhood or become an istish’hadî. Respondents were far more likely to feel like participating in resistance at all levels of anticipated sacrifice following a noncombatant death than during peace, but it is unclear what this measure is capturing since conflict-related injuries, curfews, and defense should not be necessary during a time of peace.

The numbers of respondents professing a willingness to participate in violent activities against the IDF following noncombatant casualties was small (4 percent for defense and 2 percent for istish’had). However, if we were to extrapolate the findings to the rest of the Palestinian population, the issue
begins to look more serious. In Balata’s population of 22,000,58 professed willingness to participate in defense comes to 840—a significant counterinsurgency challenge given the extremely dense housing conditions, where narrow alleys pass for roads and public space is teeming with civilians. The number of individuals reporting a willingness to become a human bomb in Balata is 420. Extrapolating those figures to the West Bank, we get 56,400 for defense and 28,200 for istish’had. Upon inclusion of Gaza (total population is 2.6 million), figures grow to 104,000 and 52,000, respectively.59

Is Participation Motivated By Selfish Values or a Commitment to Group Values?

Next, I investigated the relationship between value priorities—communal orientation and self-enhancement—and willingness to participate in resistance at various levels of anticipated sacrifice. The results of the correlations are shown here and in Figure 5.

As shown in Figures 5 and 6, communal orientation correlated positively with willingness to participate, while self-enhancement correlated negatively. This supports the value rational perspective. Individuals who espoused self-enhancement priorities reported an unwillingness to participate in collective

---

59 A stronger case could be made if actual arrest and participation figures from Balata matched these figures, but I was unable to get these from Israeli military or political officials.
action in general (during peace or war) and appeared increasingly less likely to participate as the anticipated sacrifices of resistance increased. Figure 6 illustrates this in a more accessible manner.

Figure 6 displays each correlation in exactly the predicted direction and intensity of value rational motivations. That is, self-enhancement correlated positively with no sacrifice activities—such as visiting injured people in the hospital, during a time of peace but not during a time of war. Additionally, we see that as anticipated sacrifice intensifies, self-enhancement grows increasingly negative. Communal orientation values correlate positively in every case except one—rallying during a time of peace—presumably because that would not appear to be in the interests of the collective. As anticipated sacrifice increases, positive correlations grow.
Limitations and Discussion

There are important limitations to what can be inferred from this survey.

First, as most political scientists will ask, is professed willingness to participate a true measure of future participation? The answer is simply no. But not only because it may be easier to pledge future participation than to do it (in general, humans are not good at accurately forecasting their future feelings and decisions). The inability to forecast goes both ways—apolitical, risk-averse individuals may find themselves involved in actions they had not foreseen. Indeed, that is the lesson from social-network studies. Moreover, those who have participated in high-sacrifice resistance in the past, and may therefore be seen to offer more valid answers, may also feel the most pressure to hide their true intentions. Whichever way it falls, there is no way to get around this validity problem. The survey offers a proxy for motivations that are often not explored at all, and it can certainly represent attitudes and intentions, but it does not claim to predict the future.

Perhaps the most important limitation is that we are unable to infer causation from the survey. The relationship reported here between communal orientation and professed willingness to participate in violent resistance or even *istish'had* following a child’s death is correlational. Neither ordinary least squares nor logistic regression revealed a causal relationship between the values and respondents’ anticipated behavior. Communal values did not cause respondents’ professed willingness to fight.

The literature on rebellion suggests several stories that would explain why a causal relationship was not found. One possibility is that past participation (for which data could not be collected) was driving both willingness to fight and the communal orientations associated with it. Several strains of research support this idea. For instance, Mark Beissinger showed that involvement and even proximity to contentious events in last days of the Soviet Union led to nationalist support, and the idea that communal orientation derives from a dynamic process is also found in Libby Wood’s treatment of the El Salvadoran insurgency. A more basic argument is found in the idea of cognitive consistency—people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance, in this case by changing their attitudes and beliefs to fit a participatory

---


61 It would be ideal to compare the numbers of respondents who say they would be involved in “defense” to the actual number of wanted or arrested individuals from the Balata area. I was unable to access this data.

behavior. The causal arrow may flow both ways, what is unclear is in which direction it flows stronger and what started it in the first place.

Another variable possibility that the survey did not explicitly collect data on is \textit{reactive emotions of anger or outrage}. This was a survey design flaw. Recall that the questionnaire asked respondents if they would feel like participating in each of the four sacrifice events (a) during a time of peace when both sides were keeping their promises, and (b) after a three-year-old was killed during an Israeli incursion into the neighborhood the previous night. The latter scenario potentially angered or even outraged respondents. Professed willingness to fight could therefore depend on an interaction between communal orientation and momentary anger/outrage: alternatively, the correlation between values and willingness to fight could be spurious, that is anger/outrage might have caused both sacrifice and communal orientation. As above, there is evidence to support both of these mechanisms. At an individual level, anger has been shown to cause greater risk-taking behavior, lead to blame attributions, and, in intergroup interactions, can foster retributive tendencies toward an out-group, and serve as a focal point for action. Moreover, laboratory studies show that individuals exposed to in-group mortality or images of violence perpetrated against their group become more communally oriented. These laboratory findings are being investigated at higher levels of analysis. Nicole Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn argue that repression enrages citizens, prompting a shift in tactics or compelling challengers to redouble their efforts.

The survey design was flawed in three other other important ways. First, it omitted PVQ items representing a potentially important value, \textit{stimulation}. The stimulation measures risk- and thrill-seeking propensities. Although no individual traits have been found to predict participation in terrorism (which may or may not hold for individuals involved in non-terror insurgencies), this value should be included in future surveys using the PVQ to get at motivations for joining rebellion. Second, the survey vignette was ambiguous...
at one point. Respondents were asked, “Would you feel like rallying during a curfew during peacetime?” While this is indeed a possible scenario in the West Bank—Israel has been in and out of Nablus regularly the past year despite no mention of it in the Western press—it creates problematic ambiguity. During peacetime, the Israelis may or may not be present to enforce a curfew, thus this question, and several others, leave potentially important scenario parameters to the individual imagination. It is difficult to know how respondents were conceiving the question. Lastly, willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion was coded as 0 or 1 here (respondents just checked a box if they would participate); the lack of unit variation made analysis difficult. Future surveys should include a 1 to 4 scale.

The last limitation regards generalizability. Palestine is unique in that it is rife with conditions that would seem to support value-rational living. For starters, Palestinians have endured generations of occupation\footnote{Length of occupation is a variable used to predict rebellion and stability. See Carmela Lutmar, “Military Occupations and Regime Changes: an Empirical Examination 1914–2004,” (paper presented at the Annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2008).} and watched infinite ceasefires and peace accords with Israel burn. These two types of experiences can make the experience of conflict, perhaps to both sides, feel timeless and unchangeable.\footnote{Mark Juergensmeyer theorizes about how this future orientation changes decision calculi. See Mark Juergensmeyer, \textit{Terror in the Mind of God} (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003). Importantly, the British occupied the West Bank before the Israelis. Amongst Palestinian elders, this is still remembered. I once interviewed the very old mother of a suicide bomber who mentioned that the Israelis did many covert things to destabilize their lives, in addition to the violence that was reported. When I asked, “Can you give examples?” she replied, “They switch our sugar with our salt.” At this point, her husband interrupted, saying, “No, that was the British. She is confusing the occupations.”} In addition, death due to the conflict is a frequent occurrence. According to terror management theory, this constant mortality salience would cause a general shift from instrumental to collective orientation. Add to this that Palestine is in the throes of economic despair. In such conditions, both communal orientation and value rationality—a focus on means (for example reciprocity) over ends (always uncertain)—might be evolutionary \textit{adaptive}. When you cannot trust the environment, fitness is more about who has your back (and reciprocally, whose back you have).

Even within Palestine, it is difficult to generalize claims. Balata is the poorest, most densely populated, and most rebellious camp in Palestine. Further surveys in Palestinian populations selected for their variation in grievance and community structure would help to establish generalizability and potentially causality.

\textbf{WHY MOTIVATIONS MATTER}

In this paper, I sought to compare self-interested and communal explanations for why people participate in resistance. It argued that replicable,
psychometric value surveys could contribute to the literature on motivations by directly linking self versus communal orientations to violent participation and/or attitudes toward violent participation. It then piloted such a survey in Balata Refugee Camp, near Nablus in the West Bank.

The survey produced two findings worthy of note. First, Palestinian willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Selective incentives such as money, status, and rewards in the afterlife are offered to militants in Palestine today. The fact that respondents whose relative value score was high in self-enhancement still did not report willingness to participate in high-sacrifice resistance implies that instrumental incentives are not motivating most Palestinian insurgents.

Second, even within a long-standing conflict with high levels of dehumanization, dynamic context matters. In particular, communally oriented respondents’ willingness to participate in defense during an incursion, or even become an istish‘badi, was largely a response to the vignette that read “during an Israeli incursion the night before, a four-year-old girl is killed.” This lends support to the thesis of Sambanis and Zinn, that conflict dynamics—including repression or other violent violations of proprietary values—may lead to outrage that causes participants to redouble their efforts.72 Further work on the micro-foundations of conflict is essential, specifically the potential role that intergroup events play in preference formation and intergroup behavior.

Implications for Policy

Within Balata, these correlational findings offer a stark message: when it comes to rebellion, terror, or insurgency, self-interested individuals appear to see the conflict mostly in terms of risk and sacrifice and, therefore, stay away. In contrast, communally oriented individuals seem to view the conflict in terms of justice, with a process orientation that cares more about doing the right thing than getting a particular outcome. Theoretically, within such a frame, tactics of cost-manipulation such as deterrence would be rendered almost useless.

Although causal relationships were not defined, communal orientation is clearly related to participation in rebellion. As discussed in the literature review at the beginning of this paper, communal orientation appears relatively cost-insensitive, driven as by group norms and a focus on process

---

72 Sambanis and Zinn, “From Protest to Violence.”
rather than outcome. For policy makers interested in defusing the will of a value-rational warrior, therefore, it may be useful to consider the burgeoning literature on protected or sacred values. Sacred values are defined as “any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite and transcendent significance that precludes comparisons, tradeoffs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values.” Both laboratory work and recent field experiments in Israel and Palestine have shown that individuals respond with outrage and disgust (that is, operationalized in the field survey as an emotional measure, as well as support for suicide bombing or violent punishment) when material rewards are offered for concessions in sacred values. The only thing that decreased outrage and support for violence among those with sacred values was the other side’s symbolic concession on one of their sacred values (such as recognizing the historic legitimacy of the Palestinian’s right of return or of Israel’s claim to the West Bank). Once this symbolic recognition occurred, negotiation could begin.

Future Research

A causal relationship between communal value orientation and professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion was not identified in this analysis. Communal orientation is obviously important, but how?

What starting points do we have for investigating events that trigger shifts from self-enhancement to communal orientations? At the local group level, one answer is entrance into a tight social network or strong community. But, communal proclivities appear to be prompted at a societal level as well. Experiments show that reminders of mortality, violence, and threat in general engender shifts from instrumental- to community-oriented behavior in individuals. Subjects report stronger feelings of affiliation to their social group and make value-oriented decisions that are less sensitive to individual costs and benefits. In short, their preferences change from those focusing on their individual well-being to preferences geared toward group well-being. Moreover, when subjects attribute blame for the violence to an out-group, they often consider innocent members of that out-group to be vicariously responsible (thus rendering them worthy of punishment). This leads to some testable questions, where communal orientation would become an independent variable: Can we identify differences in self-enhancement

---


74 Ginges et al., “Sacred Bounds on the Rational Resolution of Violent Conflict.”

75 Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg, *In the Wake of 9/11*.

76 Lickel et al., “Vicarious Retribution.”
versus communal value orientations based upon the amount or type of grievance individuals within a population, or populations as a whole, have suffered?

At a more foundational level, three variables were identified that might affect both communal orientation and participating behavior: (1) past participation in rebellion, or perhaps even proximity to it; (2) reactive anger or outrage, prompted by the vignette about the innocent death of a small child; and (3) mortality salience, the cornerstone of terror management theory. What is interesting is that all three of these possibilities are driven by emotion. Past participation or proximity to participation may be considered a structural variable (via its implication of social networks and spatial luck), but it operates according to social norms and/or the need for cognitive consistency—affective mechanisms. Reactive anger is an emotional response to an event or structure. The crux of terror management theory is esteem—reminders of mortality (a consequence of conflict zones, considered here as “structure”) are seen as esteem threats, which create anxiety and motivate us toward communal orientations and strongly buffered in-group worldviews.

In terms of micro-foundations, models of rationality and emotion during times of conflict and insecurity may be utterly different than those used during times of continuity. To the extent that scholars can identify the conditions giving rise to and the systematic effects of communal orientation in the context of political violence, we should be modeling it. Researchers are already doing rigorous transdisciplinary work incorporating lab and field experimentation into game theoretic models, and this work should be furthered.

In this paper, I have argued that survey methodology is an important but underutilized means for capturing the shifts in individual value orientations that likely accompany cost-insensitive participation in violent conflicts. Such surveys could be useful in identifying the triggers of value shifts and possibly—as in the case of Ginges et al.’s field experiment on sacred values—novel mechanistic approaches to conflict resolution. Value research may also offer identity theorists seeking to understand better when and how identities transform. Lisa Wedeen notes ethnic identity is not fixed, but should be conceived of in terms of intensity. Longitudinal value surveys could be one agreed-upon metric for the dependent variable: identity.

---

Data from future surveys within Palestine, corrected for the current design flaws, would be one step toward establishing causal relationships between the variables discussed above—anger/outrage, beliefs, past participation, community structure and social networks, value orientation, and professed willingness to participate in rebellion (or at least condone it). Survey sites could be selected based on variations in grievance and community structure.

Given the uniqueness of Palestinian society, similar endeavors in a variety of other areas would be interesting. For instance, would occupation versus non-occupation cases see different results? On the one hand, an occupation serves as an obvious focal point for blame, anger, and resistance, at least as time passes. However, a sense of unfair “dominance” is a key group narrative in many ethnic and civil rebellions; it may be that the official trappings matter little. To address conflict dynamics, future surveys might also choose samples from comparable conflicts where the state represses versus where it does not. Lastly, to understand better the relationship between structure and culture, it would be interesting to see what societal value structures (and sacrificial proclivities) exist in insecure places that are not suffering from political conflict.

APPENDIX A:

Survey of Resistance Activities Conducted in Balata Refugee Camp

**Instructions:** Below is a list of resistance activities that have been part of the second intifada. For each activity, the second column asks if you have participated in it at least once during the 2nd intifada (for dangerous activities, we do not allow you to answer). The third column asks if you would participate in that activity if innocent civilians from your neighborhood were killed by Israeli forces.

---

**Note:** The last column asks if you would participate in each activity. If you say yes in the last column, it does not mean you are going to do it; it means that the situation makes you feel like you could do it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>I have participated in this activity at least once during the 2nd intifada.</th>
<th>I would participate if:</th>
<th>I would participate if:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A rally or protest</td>
<td>Check (√) for yes</td>
<td><strong>A 3 yr. old noncombatant in</strong> or from my neighborhood was killed by Israeli forces during an overnight raid.</td>
<td><strong>There was a time of peace and both sides were upholding their commitments.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A rally or protest <strong>during a curfew</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. An istish'hadí operation</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Care for injured</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Be a part of a human shield to protect leaders or wanted people</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Protecting someone from the IDF</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Bring supplies for participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Burn tires</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Hang posters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Throw stones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Inform on a collaborator</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Join militant organization</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. An operation against Israeli soldiers or settlers, using a gun, where I would not die in the process.</td>
<td>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Distributing leaflets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Obeying leaflets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Write slogans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Erecting a barricade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Throw a Molotov cocktail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Distract the soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Visit a family of a martyr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B:
SCHWART VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?</th>
<th>Very much like me</th>
<th>Like me</th>
<th>Somewhat like me</th>
<th>A little like me</th>
<th>Not like me</th>
<th>Not like me at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. It is very important to him that his country be safe. He thinks the state must be on watch against threats from within and without.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says.</td>
<td>□ □ □ □ □ □</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?</th>
<th>Very much like me</th>
<th>Like me</th>
<th>Somewhat like me</th>
<th>A little like me</th>
<th>Not like me</th>
<th>Not like me at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He really does not like things to be a mess.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes to be curious and to try to understand all sorts of things.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. He believes all the world's people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in the world is important to him.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to him to keep up the customs he has learned.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he knows.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. It is important to him to be obedient.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know. It is important to him to protect the weak in society.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to him.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. He tries to see what is good in them and not to hold a grudge.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Having a stable government is important to him. He is concerned that the social order be protected.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries never to disturb or irritate others.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to be the leader.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. He believes that people should not change nature.</td>
<td>☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>